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USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORKING CLASS

AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No 3, May-June 1985

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20 November 1985

USSR REPORT
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
No 3, MAY-JUNE 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR, published six times a year in Moscow by the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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STATE OF CAPITALISM, PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN NON-WESTERN WORLD

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 pp 48-62

[Article by Nodari Aleksandrovich Simoniya, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies department chief: "The Formation of Capitalism and the Prerequisites of Proletarian Revolution in the Countries of the East"]

[Text] The accomplishment of political national-liberation revolutions in most countries of the East (that is, the achievement of political independence) in the 1940's-1950's opened up a new historical period of their social development -- an epoch of socioeconomic upheaval in which the transformation of all social structures from the base to the apex of the political and ideological superstructure began. However, in the contemporary stage the processes of historical development in the East are becoming immeasurably more complicated in connection with the increased inequality of development and the socioeconomic and sociopolitical differentiation of the liberated countries. Moreover, former colonies and semicolonies continue to be zones of political revolutions, frequent military coup d'etats, and major socioeconomic and political changes.

Against the background of turbulent political life and increased activism of various political class forces in most of the Eastern countries that are developing on the capitalist path, the relatively low effectiveness and productivity of the political actions and the class struggle of the proletariat and its vanguard -- the communist parties -- cannot fail to attract attention. And this is true despite the appreciable growth in many countries of the ranks of the proletariat, the appearance of new detachments of it related to contemporary, industrial forms of production, the indisputable rise in its organizational level, and so on. It may even seem that the political activism of the working class in some countries was even greater in the years of the struggle for political independence and soon after it was won than it is at the present time. And, in a certain sense of the word, this is in fact so, but it must still be taken into account that the reason here is hidden in differences in the very nature of political activism. During the time when independence was being achieved and secured, the working class of the Eastern countries usually acted in the mainstream of the national struggle. As a class it did not set itself apart from the general mass of anti-imperialist forces, although as a consequence of its social status as the

production force directly exploited at enterprises of foreign capital, it often found itself in the vanguard of general national forces. In this way, the proletariat's political activism in those years was not so much of a class character as a national-liberation, anticolonial character.¹ Certain communist parties in those years, ignoring this character of the proletariat's political activism, tried to attract them with other, social slogans and failed and were often disappointed in the proletariat's revolutionary nature. Some even came to the conclusion that the peasantry were more revolutionary and transferred their activism to this milieu.

After the national-liberation revolutions were for the most part accomplished and the absolute majority of the countries of the East had won political independence, the tasks of overcoming age-old backwardness and converting the countries of the East -- not formally and legally, but in reality -- from objects into subjects (and equal ones at that) of international relations, among them economic relations, were made paramount. The dialectics of the national and the social are now emerging on a new plane. While during the anticolonial struggle the major social tasks were focused in the desire for national liberation, today the deepening social-class struggle is acquiring an increasingly greater role and becoming a means of resolving social tasks, including the remaining national tasks.

Converting the external national-colonial aspect of the struggle into a national-neocolonial aspect indicates that the external factor has lost its all-consuming, self-sufficient nature. This factor now has an influence on the situation in the countries of the East, refracted through the prism of the internal political struggle, thereby becoming a facet of it. While colonialism is very important and of enormous significance, it is now not the only axis around which the turbulent events and social battles in these countries are developing. The processes of bourgeois modernization which are occurring in the East include at least three important planes: a) overcoming the colonial structures left as a legacy of the past (that is, the struggle for economic and cultural -- in the broad sense of the word -- independence); b) the transformation of traditional and semitraditional social structures and their subsequent integration into bourgeois civil society; and c) the formation and consolidation (including through the two previous processes) of the leading and centralized role of the national-capitalist order as the socioeconomic basis of the national state.

It is completely obvious that not one of these major historical tasks can be resolved by purely political methods. Prolonged constructive efforts in the economic, social, and cultural spheres are needed. And in the course of this prolonged historical period the proletariat itself will undergo quantitative and -- most importantly -- qualitative changes, consolidate itself socially, and acquire the ability to participate in the political struggle no longer from the standpoint of resolving national problems, but from its own class historical tasks. Does this mean that the group of Eastern countries being examined has entered a period of stable, steady evolutionary development, that changes in the revolutionary order are not possible here for a long time, and the proletariat is not fated to play an active political role in the social development of these countries in the near historical future? Not at all.

In fact, because of the features of the social structure in the developing countries, the pattern of inequitable development of capitalism appears there with even greater intensity. And this is linked to the greater "predisposition" of most of these countries to crises of social structures, within the framework of which the proletariat with its political vanguard can play a very substantial role. The problem is that in order to realize these opportunities, the proletariat must have a proper idea of the real nature and depth of the crises of social structures and the actual ratio and nature of the social forces taking part in it so that it can be adequately involved in the processes occurring and be able to channel them toward revolutionary resolution of social contradictions, not leaving the initiative to bourgeois political counterrevolution. In short, there must be a precise and clear understanding of the essence and specific features of the crises of social structures which the developing countries of the East are undergoing today.

Obviously, it is necessary first of all to specify the very content of the concept of the crisis of social structures. If one proceeds from the classic model of capitalist development worked out by K. Marx based on his study of a particular group of Western European countries (primarily England), crises of social structures occur in two historical situations.

First, they occur in the early capitalist phase of development of society, when there is as yet no organically whole social-production organism and when -- after the first bourgeois political revolutions -- the society is structurally reorganized, the structural elements inherited from the old society are crushed, and the multistructural character is overcome. In this case the crises of social structures arise because the bourgeois-democratic tasks have not been accomplished, that is, the bourgeois social revolution has not been completed.² A direct cause of the appearance of this type of crisis is the differing extent to which capitalism encompasses the various aspects of the socioeconomic basis and ideological-political superstructure of the states which are going through the transitional period, and the existence of a particularly high level of disparity among different components of social structures (economic, social, political, ideological, or national-ethnic) whose synthesis makes up the actual society. During these crises the whole design of the society is under critical tension which threatens the integrity of the synthesis, that is, in fact, the entire society.

The way out of the crisis situation can be either reformist or revolutionary, either preserving the actual society within the framework of the given state or breaking up and upsetting this framework. In light of this it must also be noted that the establishment after the crisis of relative correspondence among the different social structures in the given historical segment of the country's development by no means precludes the possibility of a new disparity arising between the base and the superstructure in a subsequent historical phase.

In this way, the crises of social structures differ in principle from the cyclical crises of capitalism in conditions of its mature, second phase when a sufficiently homogeneous, organically integrated system of social production already exists and crises appear as a manifestation of the patterns and contradictions inherent in this method of production (crises of overproduction

in conditions of the spontaneity and anarchy of private capitalist production). Cyclical crises of overproduction cannot occur in the first phase of capitalism. An underproduction situation is characteristic above all of backward multistructured countries. In turn, in the second phase the basis of the crises of social structures already disappears and capitalism subjugates all structures of society -- from the base to the superstructure -- to itself while the class struggle is carried out within the framework of the established "rules of the game" of bourgeois society.

Secondly, the crises of social structures arise in the last phase of capitalist development when in consequence of the emergence of the monopolistic structure, the organic integrity of the social-production organism is again upset and the socioeconomic, political, and spiritual prerequisites of the future formation arise in the depths of the overmature bourgeois society.

In this phase of capitalism, cyclical crises are still preserved "as a legacy" since the fact of the appearance of monopolies does not eliminate and objectively cannot entirely eliminate the manifestation of anarchy and competition, even though the state interferes more and more actively in the processes of social production after a certain stage of this phase in order to prevent the most destructive consequences of the cyclical crises of overproduction. It thus promotes a certain "leveling out" of the crises and disrupts their usual cycles. However, structural crises which become more and more global in nature as the trends of internationalization within the framework of the world capitalist system deepen today play a dominant role to an increasingly greater degree.

It is clear from the above that in the political sense the differences between the cyclical crises of overproduction and the crises of social structures are fundamental. It is precisely the latter which generate revolutionary situations, while cyclical crises within the framework of the second phase of capitalism cannot give birth to a revolutionary situation. This has been confirmed by the entire experience of historical development of those particular countries of Western Europe which served as prototypes of the classical, abstract-theoretical model of capitalism.

In developing countries the specifics of the crises of social structures are determined above all by differences in the model of capitalism itself.³ As a result of the colonial or semicolonial past of the Eastern countries, the early capitalist phase of development there is complicated by the existence of neocolonial structures. Thereby neocolonialism (understood not only as the aggressive and exploitative policy of imperialism but as essential phenomena in the structure of the base and superstructure of the developing countries themselves) acts as one of the major factors intensifying the crises of social structures. In other words, the genuine process of bourgeois modernization (but not the "Westernization" proposed by Western sociologists) in the countries being examined must also include the transformation of neocolonial structures and their subsequent integration into the independent national economy. This modernization inevitably encounters embittered opposition from transnational corporations and imperialism as a whole. In this way, the

modernization of social and economic structures in developing countries proves to be very closely linked to the problem of national liberation.

As the embodiment of the colonial division of labor, though modified still in essence unequal, neocolonial structures also act as the conductors of those cyclical and global structural crises which periodically shake the zone of developed capitalism. In this way, the crises of social structures which are common to the early capitalist phase are complicated in the developing countries by "reflected" crises which are imposed from without.⁴ The complexity of the problem is that neocolonial structures, being the basis of colonial-type imperialist exploitation, nonetheless act as the major source of foreign currency in the initial stages of the struggle for economic independence. Therefore, crises in the world capitalist economy limit opportunities to receive modern equipment and technology (even fuel and raw materials in certain countries) which are vitally important to the national economy which is forming. Since in the countries of the East (like the developing countries in general) we are dealing with the "catching up" model of capitalism, the very process of the formation of the capitalist method of production in nationally independent borders is subject to strong outside influence. In this way, the constricted conditions of reproduction within the framework of this method of production which is forming result not only from the existence of especially massive traditional and semitrade structures in developing countries but also from the country's own lack of many of the necessary components obtainable exclusively through the channels of international division of labor.

Furthermore, an important specific feature of the model of capitalist development of the countries of the East which also stems from its "catch-up" nature is that mature private-owner capitalism practically does not exist as an independent phase in it. As the early capitalist phase of development progresses, the imperative of bypassing the second phase becomes increasingly distinct and the trend to superimpose elements of the third phase on the incomplete first phase become more and more evident. The "premature" formation of monopolistic and even state-monopoly structures takes place. From the standpoint of the problem under study here, this means, in the first place, that in the countries of the East certain manifestations of the structural crises of the monopolistic stage of capitalism are superimposed on the crises of social structures which are characteristic of the early capitalist phase. Secondly, this means that bypassing the second phase by no means saves the developing countries from the possibility that cyclical crises of overproduction may arise, at least in those sectors where the formation of national industrial capital has achieved especially great success.

Finally, the fundamental difference between the crises of social structures in the early phase of capitalist development in the Eastern countries and the corresponding crises of capitalism in the European past is the existence today of social alternatives to the final results of the crises and the political revolutions or revolutionary changes in the political superstructure which arise from them.

In the historical epoch where the capitalist formation was in the ascendancy and was the embodiment of general human progress, political revolutions --

completely independent of the nature of their driving and guiding forces -- could act and did act only as an instrument for overcoming the remnants of the old society in the political-legal superstructure. They objectively opened up the path of bourgeois social revolution and helped finally establish the capitalist method of production. And today political revolutions in the countries of "backward" capitalism are also (if one proceeds from the present subjective internal conditions) a feature of bourgeois social revolution. Nonetheless, in present world conditions of the beginning transition from a capitalist to a communist formation, in those cases where political forces which express the trend of bourgeois development are for certain reasons unable to prevent intensification of the crisis of social structures by means and methods which are known and available to them, more radical political figures and organizations which reflect the desires of the laboring strata of the population can take the initiative and orient the development of their countries in a different formational direction -- toward socialism.

And it must not be ignored that these progressive forces operate in precisely the conditions of a country with an incomplete bourgeois social revolution with all the consequences and objective difficulties which stem from that.

So, the first phase of capitalist development in the countries of the East is of a more complex, symbiotic nature than in the West's historical past, as a result of which the crisis of social structures there becomes deeper, more multistructured, and more prolonged. However, it is not automatic and there is no guarantee that each revolutionary situation which arises from these crises will develop on a basis which is favorable for the appearance of proletarian initiative. One must not abstract from the fact that each of the Eastern countries has its own quantitatively predominant initial socioeconomic base -- in some an early capitalist base, in others a feudal-absolutist base, and in still others a feudal-tribe base, and so on to the primitive communal level; this also cannot fail to influence the nature of the appearance and course of crises. On the whole, nonetheless, in the present stage of historical development of the Eastern countries this pattern is observed: the further the country has progressed on the path of establishing a national capitalist structure, then the smaller the mass of traditional and semitrade forces which oppose the process of bourgeois modernization will be, the broader the contingent of human production forces "boiled out in the capitalist kettle" and drawn into the system of capitalist discipline will be, and the less sharply the nature (not in its external appearance but in essence) of the crisis of social structures will be manifested. And vice-versa, crises which appear in the earliest stages of capitalist modernization are usually accompanied by deeper upheavals.

The crisis of social structures appears especially sharply in countries with semifeudal-semibourgeois monarchic regimes which are trying to implement (not without the prompting and assistance of neocolonialism) bourgeois reforms or even so-called "revolutions from above" (example -- the Shah's Iran of the 1960's-1970's). Imperialism considers these countries "weak links" of its own remote periphery and gives them increased attention (especially in the 1960's). Within the framework of their general neocolonialist strategy the imperialist states (above all the United States) have worked out different conceptions of the "revolution from above" designed to prevent the crises of

social structures from intensifying and to "seize" initiative from the lower classes. These conceptions were intended in the first place for those archaic regimes and backward countries which were of strategic importance to imperialism (the existence of valuable raw materials, military-geographic position, and the like).

The phenomenon of "revolution from above" represented a characteristic feature of secondary models of capitalist development in Europe during the transition from the absolutist type of government to the Bonapartist type (Germany, Italy, and others). Today neocolonialism and the ruling circles of the corresponding Eastern countries (and, what is more, not only the East) use the phenomenon of "revolution from above" in the context of the world-wide confrontation of capitalist and communist formations; therefore, the content of the alternative of "revolution from above" or "revolution from below" is made more complicated since "revolution from below" may also not be limited to the "classical result" (acceleration of bourgeois modernization) but become the initial moment in the unfolding of social revolution of a different, higher level which orients the entire process of social modernization to the socialist future.

The crisis of social structures is of a fundamentally different character in countries with feudal-monarchic regimes which in their historical development have not yet passed through even the initial political bourgeois revolutions (Saudi Arabia and certain other countries of the Persian Gulf region, Brunei in Southeast Asia, and others). This also predetermines the typological differences of the crises of social structures which accumulate under pressure of internal changes and external circumstances. In this case the topic is the crisis of the disintegrating feudal society rather than the crisis of the bourgeois society which is forming. The response of the ruling circles in these countries to the first signs of structural crisis or even its potential threat is manifested in reforms which are implemented "from above." Nonetheless, unlike the "revolution from above" in the preceding group of countries, these reforms do not include any element of political revolution, since they signify only the transition to a new stage within or in the framework of this (feudal) type of formational development. Under these reforms no fundamental changes or advances in the political order take place. Only a greater or smaller modification takes place. They express the desire of absolute monarchies for self-preservation and the timid attempts of these monarchies to adapt to bourgeois development in the sphere of economics, especially accelerated after the "revolution in oil prices" (practically all countries of this group, with the rarest exceptions, possess petroleum resources). Stemming objectively from this is the dead-end character of the changes which occur, that is, the impossibility of overcoming by evolution those sharp contradictions and those especially sharp disproportions between the base and the superstructure which arise and are intensified as a result of swift advances in the former and the stagnation of the latter.

As for countries with a republican system, two main types can be discerned here: a) those with openly authoritarian military- and civil-bureaucratic neo-Bonapartist regimes; and b) those with parliamentary forms of government on the surface of official political life which nonetheless mask fundamental traditionalist and Bonapartist authoritarian trends in the real political

process skillfully intertwined in the context of parliamentarism ("authoritarian parliamentarism"⁵).

Above all it should be recalled that the very appearance of neo-Bonapartist regimes in the first group of countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, and a number of others) in almost all cases was the direct result of profound crises of social structures, in particular crises of attempts to "implant" a borrowed form of parliamentarism. Coming to power, military and civilian regimes of "controlled democracy" were able, for the course of a certain historical stage, to insure a "compromised" correspondence between the base and the superstructure and to maintain by force a relative equilibrium among existing sociopolitical forces with fundamental interests in different structures. But as the society progresses along the path of bourgeois modernization, the "equilibrium" is unavoidably disrupted; this leads, with objective inevitability, to the next crisis of social structures.

Of all the variants of bourgeois government in the contemporary East, the countries of parliamentary authoritarianism have up to this point demonstrated the most flexibility and adaptability to the crises of social structures which arise on the path of their capitalist evolution and a capability for reformist, compromise solutions to these crisis situations. This does not mean, of course, that in this group of countries crises of social structures are not profound and multifaceted in nature. In these societies the prebourgeois contradictions continue to be preserved to the present day, but with the course of historical development, they increasingly act as a source of unconscious but already class protest. The old mechanism of the political superstructure developed as a result of a direct compromise among the elites of the main factions of the ruling classes in time begins to corrode. The former correlation of structures changes and pressure from below -- the movement of the masses and the growth of elements of new opposition -- grows; contradictions arise within the ruling summits -- a new generation grows up with its own updated demands of the old leadership. As a result of this, old political organizations begin to "split" and the need for a new mechanism, a new model of the superstructure, and a more harmonious class structure of society increases. All these trends also prepare the situation of the structural crisis. (The trends noted were clearly demonstrated, for example, in India and Malaysia in the late 1960's -- first half of the 1970's in cases of splits in ruling parties, in the appearance of new opposition organizations, in the periodic -- partial -- successes of the latter in parliamentary elections, and the like).

The differences in types of countries noted above also condition the differences in conditions of the political struggle of the proletariat and all left and progressive forces. The differences in objective sociopolitical conditions (that is, long-term social conditions unrelated to subjective features: the behavior of certain persons, parties, and the like) in these groups of countries are usually of a fundamental nature. Thus, for example, the great maturity of class relations is characteristic of countries of parliamentary authoritarianism. The bourgeoisie is for the most part already passing out of the condition of "class in itself" here. Therefore, in the slogan "unified national-democratic front" the leftist forces are already gradually shifting the emphasis from "national" to "democratic" tasks, that

is, the organization and unity of the democratic forces of the working people (the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie) acquire paramount significance for "national" unity with the bourgeoisie (this includes its left wing). However, it should be taken into account that in this type of country the ruling circles usually possess an increased capacity for social maneuvering and for searching for compromise formulas for a reformist solution to the periodic crisis situations.

In countries with openly authoritarian "republican" (neo-Bonapartist) regimes, a certain objective basis is still preserved for the unity of actions of a relatively broad circle of national forces within the framework of the struggle for the democratization of social life. It nonetheless seems that this basis is comparatively narrow and historically impermanent, and that with the passage of time and acceleration of the formation of the capitalist method of production it will shrink rather quickly. At the same time, the level of political conflict and the potential for crises of social structures in this group of countries are substantially higher and the opportunities for a reformist solution to the crises are narrower than in the group of countries specified above.

In countries with absolutist and Bonapartist monarchic regimes, the creation of a representative front of national forces (this includes a front with broad participation of the semitradeional masses) is possible. These countries are characterized by an especially increased potential of conflict on the basis of crises of social structures; this is demonstrated by the degree to which they are induced to become involved in the process of bourgeois modernization under pressure from external global and regional factors. However, in this group of countries the possibility of the traditionalist factor actively influencing the revolutionary process and, in certain cases, direct military-political intervention by imperialist forces is also especially high.

On the whole, the conclusion may obviously be drawn that the general picture of the development of the world capitalist formation is becoming more complex and is being supplemented by a series of new contradictions and conflict situations both between developed and developing capitalist countries and within each of these groups. This includes the real possibility, in particular, of new ruptures in the peripheral links of the capitalist system which will come about in unique political forms.

In this way, the proletariat and its vanguard in the contemporary Eastern countries must operate and fight not only in socioeconomic conditions which are insufficiently ripe (and sometimes completely unripe) for social revolution but even in extremely diverse, dissimilar historical situations which require the appropriate adjustment not only on the level of tactical but at times strategic decisions. And here the question naturally arises of the level of the objective (or social) and subjective (or political) maturity of the proletariat itself. On this plane it is also necessary to confirm the existence of a large number of specific features in the nature of the development and contemporary position of the working class in the Eastern countries.

It seems that in order to more fully explain the specific features of the proletariat of developing countries it is methodologically important to single out the social and political aspects of class maturity. The point is that in contemporary internal and especially international conditions of the development of the countries of the East, a certain disparity may occur and most often does occur between these two aspects in both a substantial outdistancing and a fundamental lagging in political consciousness relative to the processes of quantitative and qualitative growth of the working class or certain factions of it.

In the historical past of the countries of Western Europe where capitalism developed particularly closely to the classical model, there was a certain correspondence between the social and political aspects mentioned. It would be better to say that political consciousness increased to the extent of and subsequent to the social consolidation of the proletariat as a class and this consolidation itself was a result of corresponding changes in the economic base of the bourgeois society.

Thus, in the early capitalist phase, the comparatively low level of development of production forces, the existence of multiple structures, and the predominance of pre-factory forms of production predetermined the unusual fragmentation of the working class which was forming and the widespread occurrence in its milieu of spontaneous, unconscious forms of protest, which in addition were frequently directed against partial, including material, manifestations of it (destruction of machine tools and machines and the like) rather than against the foundations of the economic order (which had not yet fully developed itself). In this phase the working class and some of its detachments can take an active part in the political movement but not as an independent proletarian force. In the chaotic confusion where old social orders are disintegrating and new ones are being "founded," it is not only objectively difficult and almost impossible for the proletariat but also for progressive social forces to see the features of their own very distant future. This usually leads to a turn to the "glorious" past or to a utopian future and gives rise to the influence of a broad spectrum of ideological notions -- from millennialism to anarchism -- on their political position. It is therefore not surprising that in the social and revolutionary movements of that time, the working class which had not yet matured often acted not under the leadership of its own vanguard but under the leadership of petty bourgeois or even bourgeois democracy and only at the peak of the revolutionary wave -- under the leadership of revolutionary democracy. Nonetheless, the revolutionary-democratic trend in this epoch was deprived of the potential and prospects of direct evolution toward socialism. The final objective result of this struggle was not, of course, the resolution of "superfuture" social problems which had not yet even matured but, above all, the gradual deliverance of the working class itself from its utopian and in many respects traditionalist views regarding the actual nature of the changes taking place in the society.

In this way, the first phase of capitalism is in addition the phase of the formation of the working class. While it is not yet even a "class in itself" since it exists in the form of individual factions and elements, it must still be integrated into a class which has decisively cut itself off from the

countryside and the trades. The completion of this process occurs with the onset of the second phase of capitalism. As V.I. Lenin noted, manufacturing (which predominates in the early capitalist stage) merely begins the "transformation of the spiritual make-up of the population," "but only large-scale machine industry completes it." And further: "It is precisely large-scale machine industry which produces the complete and decisive upheaval in the living conditions of the industrial population, decisively separating it from farming and from the last age-old traditions of patriarchal life related to it."⁶

In the second phase the proletariat is already a socially consolidated new social class distinguished by its particular way of life, a different system of family relations, and a new level of needs, both material and spiritual. But it is still a "class in itself," a class of bourgeois society which is socially integrated into it. In this phase, as a rule, the political activism of the working class declines and the emphasis in its struggle shifts to purely economic aspects while the struggle itself is conducted against certain "bad" masters rather than against the foundations of the capitalist system. In "Das Kapital" K. Marx showed the important differences between the early and mature stages of capitalism on the level which interests us. In particular, he points out that in the formative stage the bourgeoisie needs the intervention of a strong state in its relations with the proletariat. "It in fact uses the state authority to 'regulate' wages, that is, to keep them by force within boundaries which are favorable to extorting surplus value, and to lengthen the work day and keep the worker himself in normal dependence on capital."⁷

The phase of mature capitalism is another matter. "With the further growth of capitalist production, there develops a working class which by its education, traditions, and customs recognizes the conditions of this method of production as self-evident natural laws. The organization of the developed capitalist process of production demolishes any opposition. . . the blind force of economic relations consolidates the supremacy of capitalists over the workers. Noneconomic, direct force is still used, it is true, but only as the exception. With the usual course of affairs, the worker can be subjugated to the authority of the 'natural laws of production,' that is, dependence on capital which is created by the conditions of production themselves and which these conditions guarantee and perpetuate."⁸

The following is another important reason that in the second phase the proletariat is still a "class in itself": in conditions of private owner capitalism, the formation of the collective of direct producers subordinate to the capitalist signifies the emergence of the element of direct social production relations, but the existence of the latter is possible only as a result of the preliminary conversion of the working class through exchange, that is, through an indirect, material link, into a component of individual capital. As a result, the comparatively small collectives of direct producers, acting in the domain of individual, private capitals, oppose each other as competitive units. This circumstance also prevents, among other things, the working class from solidifying into a nation-wide political force. Nonetheless, in this phase scientific socialism is already being conceived and the process of its unification with the most progressive detachments of the

working class is beginning; as a result, the proletariat's role as a whole in the social struggle of a number of countries increases. The processes of savings, concentration, and centralization of capital which occur in the second phase prepare for the transition to the third phase of capitalism and, at the same time, to new qualitative changes in the position and character of the working class.

With capitalism's entry into the monopolistic phase, the framework within which the directly social character of labor is manifested substantially broadens. As a result of this, the process of political consolidation of the proletariat and the mass renovation of its spiritual make-up accelerate substantially. In mass it is finally converted into a "class for itself," that is, a class which is politically aware of its fundamental interests and the antagonistic opposition of these interests to the interests of the exploiting classes. The objective conditions for the direct unification of the mass detachments of the worker movement with scientific socialism are thereby created as well. But as the trend toward the internationalization of capital increases and intensifies, the political movement and the proletariat's struggle also cross national boundaries and become increasingly international.

Such, in its most general features, is the evolution of the proletariat in the countries of the primary model of capitalism. But the secondary model shows us very fundamental deviations. The "premature" appearance of the elements of the second and third phases in the countries of this model allowed, for example, V.I. Lenin to formulate the idea of the counterrevolutionary nature of the liberal bourgeoisie and the hegemony of the proletariat back in the first, bourgeois-democratic revolution; this was brilliantly affirmed by the entire course of the revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia. The situation in the contemporary East is also more complex and more diverse, even as compared to the countries of the "secondary" model of capitalism. The proletariat here is at different levels of development and by no means plays the same role in the sociopolitical life of particular countries. But if one speaks on the whole, then in most Eastern countries the mass of the proletariat is simultaneously represented by typologically dissimilar detachments. In a number of cases the three types described above, which correspond to the three phases of capitalism, may be simultaneously represented within the confines of this class. But two other complicating features should be added to this: in the first place, the existence in these countries of neocolonial structures and the particular position of the proletariat engaged in the framework of these structures; secondly, the preservation in the countries of the East of powerful traditionalist strata which, in addition, (unlike the European countries in the past) cannot always be unequivocally characterized as feudal. In this case a broad spectrum of prebourgeois relations, including prefeudal relations, is presented. These strata serve as an important source for replenishing the rapidly growing ranks of the working class.

In comparing the processes of the formation and development of the proletariat in the countries of the East and the West, one other important circumstance must not be overlooked: the centuries-old backwardness of the developing countries is also manifested in the "foundation floor" of their societies, specifically in the national-ethnic structure. The uncommon variety and

complexity of the national-ethnic and religious situation distinguishes the countries of the East. It is particularly complex (to the point of open conflict and even separatism) in those cases where national-ethnic and religious barriers which separate large groups of the population coincide with socioeconomic or even structural borders. In these situations the growth of the proletariat's class self-consciousness is slowed by decades.

In brief, in consequence of the features of capitalist development, the proletariats of most Eastern countries have not "boiled down" in the "kettle" of factory production and do not yet have deep traditions of their own class struggle. The pre-factory proletariat, which is as a rule isolated from the main streams of contemporary reproduction processes and has not completely severed its ties with the land and urban trades and whose make-up is in many respects determined by the condition of family-patriarchal relations, predominates numerically in the general mass of the proletariat of the Eastern countries. Even those detachments of the working class which are engaged in the modern industrial sector carry the imprint of traditionalist psychology.

Those strata of the proletariat which are related to neocolonial structures and the activities of transnational corporations, that is, those which work at enterprises with, as a rule, the highest level of technology and production forces for that country, also occupy an isolated position in the general structure of the working class. On the one hand, the enclave nature of transnational corporation enterprises in the economic structure of most (although not absolutely all) developing countries of the East accounts for this, and, on the other -- the fact that this proletariat group is in a relatively privileged position.

By no means are we talking about the privileged position which certain groups of working people enjoy in the countries of developed capitalism. The fact is that other strata of the proletariat of the countries of the East do not receive even the product necessary for normal (from the standpoint of the laws of capitalism) reproduction of work force. And these strata cannot view the position of workers at transnational corporation enterprises as other than privileged. No scientific calculations and theoretical discourses can force them to change their point of view. Each day their consciousness records a visible barrier which separates them from the worker who lives in a cottage built by the firm, and moreover with a certain minimum of conveniences (plumbing, hot water, electricity, and the like), who enjoys privileged medical care, whose children can use the company's sports areas, and so on and so forth. From a practical-political point of view, including in order to perform the task of political consolidation of the working class, it is precisely this factor which is of importance rather than theoretical arguments which fairly refute the supposed privilege of the corresponding strata of the working class (although obviously one must also not completely exclude the possibility of the artificial formation of a narrow interlayer of genuinely privileged workers).

The above-mentioned dissimilar nature of the proletariat in the countries of the East accounts for the objective difficulties which stand in the way of its social and political consolidation as a class. But it would be wrong to draw the unequivocal conclusion from this that the proletariat in general has no

significant democratic and revolutionary potential. The dialectics of the situation are that it is precisely as a result of the backwardness of capitalism in the countries of the East that the process of the formation of the proletariat in them is subject to the influence -- unusual in scope, depth, and diversity -- of external factors. As a result of this, the acceleration of the processes of consolidation of the proletariat and the growth of its political consciousness is inadequate to the level of internal socioeconomic development, and the forms of the organization and struggle of the proletariat are borrowed from outside; these forms were worked out in the West's worker movement in substantially later stages of capitalist evolution (trade union organizations, collective negotiations, sector-wide and nationwide strikes, political strikes -- for example, as a sign of protest against the actions of internal reaction, acts of solidarity with the anti-imperialist struggle of other peoples, and much, much else). Of course, the opportunities for such acceleration and rapid development of class-political consolidation of the proletariat in the Eastern countries are not infinite, and here it is sometimes easy to fall into dangerous exaggeration. But the underestimation of these features also threatens the loss of initiative in critical moments of historical development (crises, revolutionary situations) of the corresponding countries.

Of course, the impact of the external factor on the development of the proletariat of the countries of the East is ambiguous. After all, the contemporary world is divided into two opposing systems and the spectrum of ideological-political influence issuing from them is very broad. In addition, the nature of the present regimes in the very Eastern countries which are trying -- to a greater or lesser degree -- to filter external influences, thereby creating unequal opportunities for a various kinds of influences, is also of enormous importance.⁹ Therefore, the process of enlisting certain detachments of the proletariat in these countries in the class-political struggle also occurs on various levels and an entire range of political hues can be seen in the comparatively young trade union movements of these countries.

The impact of various internal and external factors of the formation of the proletariat in the countries of the East leads to an exceptional diversity of forms of social protest: represented here are traditionalist-religious movements and unique Luddite (for example, the destruction of carriages by rickshaws in a number of countries of Southeast Asia) or other spontaneous riots and demonstrations, the manifestation of anarchy-syndicalism, and so on up to the modern-type organized trade union and political revolutionary movement. Naturally, certain designs of this mosaic in different countries are very dissimilar and certain elements of it are in a different ratio while the ratio itself changes depending on the stage of historical development. Special political art and fine political sensitivity are therefore needed so that these diverse forms of class protest are directed into the necessary course at the crucial historical moment for the country.

With the development of capitalism and acceleration of the process of proletarianization of the working class, the mosaic nature of its structure will be gradually overcome. But at the same time it is important not to ignore the following circumstance: between the development of capitalism and the

numerical growth of the proletariat, on the one hand, and the qualitative characteristics of this class on the other, there is no absolute and direct correspondence. Moreover, a reduction in the general level of its consolidation and political consciousness is characteristic precisely for the first stages of numerical growth of the proletariat. This is observed in practically all countries of the East but is especially noticeable in those places and in those periods where the intermittent acceleration of capitalist modernization of society is taking place.

This was the case, for example, in Iran during the "white revolution" (1960's-1970's) carried out by the Shah. During the bourgeois agrarian reform implemented "from above," many millions of the population were ejected from a traditional way of life and, thanks to the existence of abundant "petrodollar" resources, then quickly involved in large-scale industrialization of the country. From a purely political-economic standpoint, the numerical expansion of the Iranian working class as a result of these events was remarkable. It is completely apparent, however, that these newly appeared proletarians simply could not get rid of their traditionalist peasant psychology for some years and entered the period of the deep crisis of social structures which shook the country in the late 1970's under the green flags of orthodox Islam. This in no way means that the traditionalist variant of the outcome of the Iranian revolution was fatally predetermined. The inevitability of this result appeared only after it became clear that the entire spectrum of Iran's political revolutionary forces (communists, "fedayeen," "mojahedeen," and the left wing of the bourgeois nationalists) was disorganized and unable to unite even for a time into a national-democratic front in order to prevent the initiative from passing into the hands of the orthodox Islam leadership at the start of the revolution. Many revolutionaries were still in the heat of noisy battle with the overthrown Bonapartist-monarchic counterrevolution when the orthodox Islamic counterrevolution was already knocking at the door.

The situation in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab sultanates of the Persian Gulf region is distinguished by unusual distinctiveness. The rapid formation in the social base of capitalist structures there, which is also stimulated by abundant "petrodollar" revenue, is generally not accompanied (unlike in Iran) by the formation of the working class from representatives of the indigenous population. The basic proletarian mass consists of the immigrant work force imported from the most diverse corners of the East (from the Arab East to the Far East). These workers are not allowed to be local citizens [grazhdantsvo] or subjects [poddantsvo] and are completely without political rights. Moreover, in some of these countries the contingent of immigrant work force is periodically replaced in order to make more difficult or completely impossible even a short-term manifestation of organization and solidarity among these workers. It is obvious that in such countries the prospects of class and political consolidation of the proletariat in the immediately foreseeable future are exceptionally problematic and that the revolutionary forces of these countries will be forced to begin from this objective circumstance in the event of an exacerbation of the crisis of social structures there.

In countries where capitalist modernization is taking place on a much more moderate and extensive basis (the development of capitalism not only in depth

but also in breadth) and where the present form of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism not only allows a mass trade union movement but the legal activity of communist parties as well, as is happening in India, for example, the gap between the quantitative growth of the proletariat and its qualitative evolution is not so deep. But there the factor of increased social mobility, especially among the skilled and highly paid categories of workers, which has a negative effect on the process of consolidating the proletariat, is of fundamental significance in the initial stages of capitalist development.

All these factors are convincing proof of the fact that simple arithmetic calculations of the numerical growth of the proletariat in the countries of the East and attempts to formulate some kind of generalized picture of it do not help at all to work out the correct tactics or even strategy of revolutionary struggle. An analysis by particular country of the real structure of the working class which is forming and attentive consideration of the specifics of the particular factions and elements of the class which compose this structure are of much greater significance.

In this way, the development of capitalism which is occurring in a large group of developing countries in the East is of a very specific, symbiotic character. It is marked by the strong stamp of unevenness and, in certain cases, even a spasmodic character which is associated with periodic exacerbations of the crises of social structures. In a number of cases the course of these crises was expressed in the past and will be expressed in the future in revolutionary situations and revolutionary upheavals which in the present world epoch of the opposition of two social systems opens up the possibility of reorienting the formational development (interrupting the capitalist evolution) of certain countries. Nonetheless, the realization of this possibility depends in many respects on the maturity of the subjective factor and the existence of a revolutionary vanguard capable of taking the historical initiative in its own hands and realizing this possibility. As the particular-historical experience of the last four decades has shown, this mature subjective factor is by no means always present in those cases where things have come to a revolutionary upsurge. Therefore, revolutions have led and will lead to different concrete results. Not only are successful "revolutions from below," that is, revolutions of the working masses under the leadership of their vanguard, possible, but also "revolutions from above" carried out by the exploiting summit after incomplete political revolutions from below or in the name of preventing them.

In conclusion, I would like to dwell on one problem whose consideration would be useful in developing the strategic and tactical goals of revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries which are developing along the capitalist path. This problem stems from the fact of the imposition in these countries of elements and trends of the third phase of capitalism on the first phase and in this way bypassing the second phase as such. It follows from establishing this fact that, in the first place, genuine bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism (which corresponded in the countries of Western Europe to the second phase of capitalism) in the countries of the East is already impossible, and that different variants of regimes, neo-Bonapartist in deep essence, exist there which are intended to insure a "premature" transition of social development of the corresponding countries to the third phase. In the

sociopolitical sphere this involves the imposition of authoritarianism and bureaucratization of the state which are characteristic of the phase of state-monopoly capitalism on the authoritarian nature and bureaucratism characteristic of early phases of capitalist development, which can also lead to continuity of the autonomous (though in an updated capacity) position of bureaucracy with all the conclusions regarding the prospects of the formation of parliamentary democracy in these countries which stem from it. This means that on a tactical level people can and should fight to change various authoritarian forms of government -- to replace openly military-police and terrorist dictatorships with regimes of authoritarian parliamentarism which open up the possibility of legal mass struggle of vanguard forces of working people without, nonetheless, exaggerating the real significance of this struggle.

On a strategic level the establishment of the above-mentioned fact means that the idea formulated by Marxists in the 19th-early 20th centuries in regard to posing the question of possible prospects of bourgeois social upheaval -- namely that there would be either a democratic formation of capitalism which grows from below and in breadth and which brings the society in a certain phase to bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism or the development of capitalism "from above," where the authoritarianism of a lower order is replaced by authoritarianism of the higher order -- is already inapplicable in the modern Eastern countries. Today another type of alternative is possible: either a leap directed and controlled from above to avoid certain phases and stages of capitalist development or a departure from the confines of bourgeois-democratic revolution and orientation (in one particular political form or another) to socialism. No third alternative is given, although in the first and second cases an enormous diversity of specific historical variants is possible, among them the diversity caused by different ratios of elements of the contemporary and the traditional, reaction and democratism.

FOOTNOTES

1. It is notable that in those countries where objective historical conditions allowed communists to be in complete or partial charge of the process of the liberating anticolonial struggle, the victory of the national-liberation struggle also signified the beginning of a new, social revolution (Vietnam, China).
2. Let us recall that V.I. Lenin studied such crises precisely in connection with the epoch "prior to the final affirmation of the national path of capitalism" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 47, pp 231-232).
3. For more details on this see: "Evolyutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo" [The Evolution of Eastern Societies: The Synthesis of the Traditional and the Contemporary], Moscow, 1984, pp 264-295.

4. The term "reflected crises" is borrowed from the monograph "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: ekonomicheskiy rost i sotsial'nyy progress" [The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress] (Moscow, 1983, pp 161-162), but its meaning in this case differs slightly, since the impact of such crises takes place most probably on all structures in developing countries involved in the neocolonial division of labor.
5. For more details on this form of the state system in the countries of the East see: "Evolutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv. . . , op. cit., pp 296-381.
6. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 3, pp 434, 541.
7. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works] Vol 23, p 748.
8. Ibid., p 747.
9. While on this point, the very impact of the state on the worker movement is of an immeasurably broader and more purposeful character than in the historical past. It combines crude despotic methods of noneconomic coercion characteristic of the first phase of capitalism with more refined and flexible methods of ideological impact in the spirit of later phases of capitalism.

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THE MASS ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT: QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGY AND POLICY

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[Text] One of the most remarkable and qualitatively new phenomena in the political life of the developed capitalist countries in the 1980's has been an antiwar movement of unprecedented mass involvement and breadth of social composition. It is developing in conditions of the sharp exacerbation of the general crisis of capitalism, accelerated militarization of the economy, and reactionary changes in the domestic and foreign policies of imperialist circles.

Objectively, the contemporary antiwar protest is directed above all against the military-industrial complex (VPK) which, in alliance with the most reactionary part of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, is implementing a program of modernization of means of mass destruction at the expense of restricting the material and spiritual needs of the working people; the VPK is conducting a course of increasing international tension and asserting its hegemony in the world arena, and is trying to suppress the worker movement and all forces of democracy and progress in the countries of capital. The antiwar protest movement is in one of the main directions of the working masses' opposition to the social-regressive, dehumanizing trends of contemporary capitalism whose development in the nuclear age continually aggravates the threat to the very existence of man and mankind.

The most varied social-class groups of bourgeois society are becoming involved in the struggle to prevent a nuclear apocalypse and to preserve universal peace. The growth of civilian responsibility for the country's fate and for the future of mankind stimulates the activism of the masses and draws in many social strata which were formerly politically inert or acted primarily out of economic interest into the sphere of political struggle.

The slogans of antiwar demonstrations such as, for example, "peace and work" demonstrate that the working masses in capitalist countries are gradually recognizing the direct tie between the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, the escalation of the arms race, and the economic roots of the policies of imperialism -- the main source of the danger of war. This not only attests to the fact that the inertness of antimilitarist consciousness which is traditional for a number of social groups has begun to be overcome but also that its content is being deepened.

Influential social forces whose interests objectively coincide with the principle of peaceful coexistence and the development of peoples in conditions of security for all are represented in the contemporary antiwar struggle. These forces are above all the working class and the new and traditional middle strata of the city and the countryside. Nonmonopolistic and even monopolistic groups of the bourgeoisie which are not connected with the military-industrial complex have an interest in supporting relations of cooperation among various social systems.

The new mass antiwar movement which formed in the 1980's has taken an important place among the peace-loving forces of the present day -- the countries of the socialist community, the international communist movement, many dozens of states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the nonaligned movement, and realistically thinking sociopolitical circles of the capitalist countries.

Marxist researchers see the historic novelty of the contemporary antiwar movement, as in a number of others formed in the last 1-2 decades of social protest movements, in the organic tie of causes of the development of these movements to the appearance in the second half of the 20th century of global issues, including the main question -- preserving the foundations of civilization. The task of the antinuclear, antimissile movements of the 1980's is not the struggle against war in general (in the spirit of traditional pacifism) or against militarism as a whole. The contemporary antiwar protest of the masses is clearly oriented against the threat of the extinction of the human race in the chaos of nuclear catastrophe. This is its main distinction from the previous stages of the antiwar struggle.

The expansion of the mass base and social composition of the antiwar movement, intensifying its political and ideological heterogeneity, increases the protest's democratic potential. At the same time, however, the problem of its politically effective use is becoming crucial and it is becoming more complicated to develop a realistic platform of demands whose implementation could bring closer the achievement of the movement's long-range and ultimate goals -- to lessen the threat of a world military cataclysm, turn back the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and secure universal lasting peace.

The rapid development of the mass antiwar movement which enjoys the support and sympathy of tens of millions of people² graphically confirmed the vast potential of social protest accumulated in the depths of contemporary bourgeois society and revealed previously hidden, insufficiently used

opportunities for mobilizing this protest. The problem of searching for ways and forms of accomplishing class and political alliances and creating mass democratic coalitions arose in many respects in a new way in these conditions before the worker movement and the communist parties of the developed capitalist countries. Solving it requires accumulating, theoretically interpreting, and politically incorporating the practical experience of the joint actions of different forces in the struggle for peace and social progress. Identifying the specific features of the contemporary mass antiwar protest and new features in the ideological and political evolution of its subjects is a component of this work.

This article examines some fundamental problems of studying one of the most interesting phenomena of sociopolitical experience in the 1980's in the zone of developed capitalism -- the new antiwar movement -- on a theoretical-methodological basis. They are primarily problems of the mass base (changes in social opinion, formation of antiwar consciousness, social composition), the development of ideology (its ideological-theoretical sources, basic elements, and method of operation), and the specific nature of political alliances (both within the movement itself and with other political forces) to achieve the goals of the antiwar struggle.

The "explosive" nature of the response of mass consciousness in the countries of the West to the increased threat of war, like the rate of spread and intensity of antiwar sentiments, is in many respects related to the specific nature of the social-psychological situation which took shape in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The prolonged and profound economic upheavals led to widespread feelings of the instability of life, the insecurity of existence, and uncertainty about the future among the masses. Pessimism concerning the social consequences of technical progress gradually supplanted the technocratic optimism of the first decades of the scientific-technical revolution. Liberal-reformist consciousness oriented to the "universal welfare state" proved to be in profound crisis as a result of the clear decline in the efficiency of state-monopoly mechanisms of regulating the economy and social relations. Uncertainty about the future turned into a factor which had a significant effect on public opinion. For example, in late 1981 only 13 percent of West Germans, 15 percent of the Dutch, one quarter of the Italians, 30 percent of the English, and about one-third of the French believed that the next year would on the whole be better than the last.³

The exacerbation of international tension led -- against this social-psychological background -- to the public's beginning to consider nuclear catastrophe less and less a strictly hypothetical possibility and more and more a very real prospect. While in 1977 14 percent of the people surveyed in "Common Market" countries agreed with the opinion that in the next 10 years, more likely than not, there would be a world war, in 1980 the figure was already 34 percent. This trend appeared most clearly in countries which possess nuclear weapons: in Great Britain the corresponding share rose from 13 to 39 percent; and in France -- from 14 to 42 percent.⁴

The mass ideological offensive launched around the start of the present decade by the most conservative circles of the ruling class of imperialist countries played a special role in disseminating the idea of the reality of the nuclear

threat. It was intended to mobilize public opinion in support of turning toward toughening confrontation with the socialist countries and initiating a new round of the arms race. Against the background of an increased trend toward critical reevaluation of the legacy of the preceding period in all spheres of social life and the conversion of neoconservatism into an influential ideological-political force, the exploitation of the theses of the "Soviet military threat" and the "lagging of the West" in the military field, which actualized a number of anticommunist and anti-Soviet stereotypes, played a certain role in moving the axis of political life in the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, and some other countries to the right. On this basis, in 1979-1981 a relatively favorable sociopsychological climate developed (especially in the United States) for carrying out decisions on increasing military expenditures.

Nonetheless, this propaganda campaign proved to be the catalyst of those processes in the development of mass consciousness which are substantially reducing its effectiveness. As mass consciousness assimilated various information on the probable consequences of nuclear conflict (which in the early 1980's became generally available because of tougher debates on questions of foreign and military policy in most countries of the West), the purposefully implanted fears regarding the "Soviet military threat" were transformed into fear of nuclear war as such. The mechanism of this evolution -- applicable to the United States -- was very precisely characterized by an American researcher: "If the situation had not been treated in ominous tones, the public and Congress would not have sanctioned the envisioned change in budget priorities; but when the public accepted the thesis of the extreme seriousness of the threat hanging over the country or acknowledged that the President believed in it, fear of both war and the use of nuclear weapons began to become widespread."⁵

This process is enhanced by the fact that a force-based approach to the problems of international relations is very clearly seen in the goals of the U.S. administration and the ruling circles of NATO on achieving military superiority over the USSR, on "limited nuclear war," "possible victory in a prolonged nuclear conflict," and the like. The gradual realization that nuclear war is not a means of resolving contradictions among states but a global catastrophe and the end of the history of one's own country and of all world civilization in large part devalues and neutralizes (although it does not eliminate) traditional foreign policy orientations and produces a trend toward critical reevaluation of the entire complex of ideas on ways to strengthen security.

Already in 1981 50 percent of Americans agreed that war is an obsolete method of resolving international contradictions while 45 percent thought so in 1975.⁶ The fact that despite the extremely active (and in certain regards very effective) efforts by conservative and openly rightist forces focused on overcoming the "Vietnam syndrome," the opinion cited above acquired new supporters, even though slowly, eloquently attests to the erosion of the traditional approach to the problems of war and peace.

On the basis of a combination of growing alarm over the possible consequences of U.S. foreign policy and traditional anti-Soviet stereotypes, a reevaluation

of the strictly one-sided (pro-American) version of events is observed in Western Europe. False but nonetheless undesirable for the military-industrial complex ideas on the "equal responsibility of the superpowers" for aggravated international relations and the increased threat of war are becoming widespread in mass consciousness. A substantial part of the Western European public is inclined toward neutralism. The example of Spain is especially instructive in this regard; there the ratio of supporters for joining NATO declined in 5 years (1978-1983) from 27 percent to 17 percent of the country's population while the opponents of this step rose from 15 percent to 56 percent.⁷ Neutralist trends have even become substantially widespread in England, where the principles of "Atlantic solidarity" had formerly received strong support in public opinion. Already by late 1981 46 percent of Englishmen assumed that Great Britain should "become neutral" (almost 43 percent favored "being on the U.S. side"). And 29 percent of those surveyed saw a greater threat to Great Britain's security in the coming deployment of American missiles in Western Europe than in the missiles of the other side (43 percent were of the opposite opinion).⁸

The desire to disassociate themselves from the North Atlantic Alliance represents a relatively passive variant of the response of the Western European community to the increased threat of war.⁹ A different approach is also widespread: opposition to the NATO course of rapid reequipping and increasing international tension in combination with the conviction that this institution can in principle serve the cause of strengthening European security. This approach is especially characteristic of mass consciousness in the Netherlands. In 1982 76 percent of the Dutch believed that their country should remain a member of NATO (and this indicator had remained almost unchanged since 1974)¹⁰; nonetheless, as is well known, it was precisely the Dutch public which proved to be very intensely opposed to NATO's plans for "arms upgrading."

The development of any of the variants of sentiments mentioned above to a significant extent relies on a delineation of interests between the United States and Western Europe, including the NATO member-countries, which touches on many if not all the important problems of foreign policy. The group of these problems includes, among others, interpretation of the nature of the conflict between the East and the West, evaluation of detente and economic ties, the role of the military factor (the globalization or regionalization of the risk of nuclear war) and the significance of relations with developing countries. Judging from all factors, clashes on these and a number of other problems will continue at least through the 1980's. In the opinion of researchers, they are a part of the structure of relations between the United States and Western Europe and are intensified by the conservative course of the present American administration.¹¹

In the United States the increased alarm over the possible consequences of the arms race and the exacerbation of international tension resulted in the extremely great popularity of the idea of freezing nuclear arsenals.¹² This proved possible, among other reasons, because the freeze slogan, which is objectively an antithesis to the militarist course of the Reagan administration, ignores the question of the source of the nuclear threat. Let

us note that apparently the idea of the freeze is shared by practically all antiwar organizations in the capitalist countries for the same reason.

The trend toward changing priorities within the framework of the foreign policy component of mass consciousness, related to a growing understanding of the reality of the nuclear threat and making the deeply practical and vitally important task of reducing nuclear arms and the level of tension in the international arena paramount, created favorable prerequisites for the growth and consolidation of the antiwar movement in the United States and Western Europe and in turn stimulated its development.

The contemporary antiwar protest movement has been prepared by the aggregate social experience of the last two decades and the logical development of social movements and ideological trends during this period in capitalist countries. It is therefore completely natural that it is developing from several sources which differ in nature, objectives and specific demands, the composition of participants, spheres, scope, and forms of activity. They are represented as traditional organizations -- committees of the peace movement which are members of the World Peace Council, pacifists, including religious pacifists, and others (among them are those people whose activities are of a long-term nature and rely on a developed worldview platform or system of demands) -- along with new antinuclear, antimissile groupings. Formations of the second type are on the whole less stable than formations of the first type but are capable of regenerating themselves rapidly -- on a previous or diversified social base -- around the latest problems (for example, after the first stage of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe -- the movement to completely dismantle them).

The turn of ecological, youth, neofeminist, and various other alternative movements (citizens' initiatives, communalist movements, antiauthoritarian movements and the like) toward the problems of the antimilitarist struggle was of particular importance in the development of the contemporary antiwar movement. The diverse groups and organizations which make up these movements, theoretically united by the concept of "new social movements," in the 1970's criticized a number of aspects of bourgeois civilization as well as demanded the humanization of human relations in all fields of social life. Many authors consider a new type of consciousness, which they often define as "postmaterial antibourgeois consciousness,"¹³ to be the general basis of all these dissimilar actions. Its definition is very ambiguous but yet it is possible to discern its characteristic general features. In contrast to the traditional bourgeois system of values -- belief in success, efficiency, hierarchy, subordination, skill, discipline, career, authority, and status, the new system of values is oriented to human feelings, humaneness, solidarity, self-determination, creativity, and individual development.¹⁴

The emergence of these value orientations reflects objective changes in the social-class composition of society and -- on a more abstract level -- in the structure of social production. As the scientific-technical revolution developed in the capitalist countries, those spheres of it in which expanded reproduction of the social and spiritual premises of labor is accomplished occupied a special place. The development of this sphere of activity and its subjugation to labor-capital relations, which if necessary originated with

increasing intervention by the state, led to an increase in the zone of social contradictions and caused an exacerbation of the crisis of bourgeois-democratic political institutions.¹⁵ Shifts in the interrelations of the material and spiritual sectors of social production -- a relative decline in the role of the former and an increase in the latter as a factor of development -- changed the general picture of social conflicts which was characteristic of bourgeois society up to the mid-1960's. Contradictions traditional for capitalism were supplemented, intensified, and correspondingly supplanted by the new type of social conflict -- "the way of life conflict." As English political scientist Ch. Mouffe notes in this regard, as a result of the dissemination of capitalist production relations to an ever-larger number of forms of social and personal life, the "previous social ties break down and give way to new relations of supremacy, which gives rise to opposition by the masses" (let us note that for her and for a number of other Western researchers "the new antagonisms" are not class antagonisms even though, in their opinion, "the new social struggle undoubtedly contains demands which are basic to socialist strategy" but only to the extent that the bourgeois "model of productive development" and the "bureaucratic state" are questioned).¹⁶

The line of the new conflict passed not only and frequently not so much along earlier social-class boundaries as it crossed them, revealing a changed social-class configuration of society and splitting the political camps which had taken shape; this led to the fragmentation of groupings opposing the establishment. It proved to be possible to unite all these separate trends of protest in the struggle for the most indisputable human value -- the preservation of life on earth -- within the framework of the peace movement.

The composition of the participants in the contemporary antiwar movement -- the predominance in its ranks of college and secondary students and representatives of the new middle strata and the involvement in it of the new, most socially-developed groups of the working class and the worker intelligentsia -- results in a new correlation and a new type of ties between the mass base of the movement and its creative vanguard which develops and propagandizes the ideological precepts.

Traditionally, working out the ideology of many mass movements was, by general rule, the work of particular representatives of the intelligentsia who managed to overcome the narrowness of their views and become the spokespersons for the interests of the masses. The situation is different in the new protest movements which are now being formed. Their social base is primarily the mass strata who appeared in the arena of social life as a result of the scientific-technical revolution and people who are educated and are inclined toward a critical, analytical attitude toward the life of the society. For them active participation in alternative movements signifies not only and not so much following ready-made ideological-political doctrines but the opportunity for creative self-expression through participating in the formulation of ideology. In this sense, for many of its participants support of a mass social movement is not only a means of resolving urgent political problems, but also a way to satisfy their needs for expression and activity. These needs are felt more deeply where the level of sophistication and education is higher, where the individual in principle has more possibility of influencing the social process, where the sphere of individual self-expression is more severely

constricted in conditions of capitalist rationalization, operationality, and depersonalization of labor relations, and where there are fewer remaining channels for independent activity and self-realization within the framework of the capitalist way of life.

The democratic principles upon which the movement is based and the lack of strict disciplinary norms and restrictive obligations and conditions when entering its ranks allow each participant to freely propagandize his own system of ideas, views, and values. Nor are there restrictions on the forms of agitation and political self-expression. As a result, there is practically no ideological elite in the new antiwar movement where the principle of the continued rotation of political leadership operates, although there are influential leaders and organizers (in Great Britain -- B. Kent, G. Raddock, and M. Harbottle; in the FRG -- P. Kelly, J. Leinen, G. Bastian, and O. Lafontaine; and in the United States -- D. Ellsberg, R. Forsberg, H. Belafonte, and so on). To one degree or another the participants in the movement are drawn into individual or collective creation of ideology; individual persons or groups of like-minded people act as the creators of all kinds of concepts and the authors of slogans and local initiatives.

The ideology of the contemporary movement is formulated on the basis of and through the conglomeration of dissimilar ideas and ideological conceptions, the spectrum of which ranges, specifically, from pacifism in its various forms to antimilitarism, which is clearly delineated in an ideological-theoretical sense; and each of the trends preserves its own foundations, intersecting with others on strictly particular or, in contrast, general issues which are not of a clearly expressed worldview character. In these conditions any attempt to impose a uniform orientation on the movement ends in even greater divergence of the movement's ideological elements rather than in its consolidation. This does not mean, of course, that the ideological evolution of the new antiwar movement is completely devoid of any general orientation, but only emphasizes the particular complexity and duration of the formation of its ideology and the uniqueness of its possible foundations. Nor does this mean that the movement does not face the problem of substantiating its ideological-political platform.

In this connection, the inclusion in the antiwar protest of scientists, especially representatives of the "science of peace" -- paxology, plays an important though not unambiguous role in the formation of its ideology. The opinion exists among Western scientific researchers that paxology specialists can fulfill various functions -- provide those who make policy with advice based on the theoretical conclusions of paxology; conduct research and construct theories regardless of whether they will have influence or not; and oppose the official policy line (for example, participating in developing a platform of demands for antiwar organizations) if research gives the grounds for such a political position. Two basic approaches are discerned in "peace research": multifaceted study of questions of preventing nuclear war and limiting the arms race, including analyzing economic, social, and other factors, as well as an attempt to formulate problems of securing peace, based primarily on individual psychology and moral precepts. By itself this research orientation, if in practice it is not expressed as abstract moralizing, is very significant.

The orientation toward general human interests which is characteristic of the new antiwar protest has made its moral, ethical, and "humanitarian" side more significant.¹⁸ Thus, the specific nature of the ideological motivation of believers regarding their broad participation in the antiwar movement consists in the priority of precisely the moral, rather than political, military-strategic, or socioeconomic, aspect. Therefore, such a type of reasoning as, let us say, the necessity of military equality, insuring national security, the perniciousness of the economic consequences of the arms race, and the like have a relatively weak impact on those participating in the antiwar movement for religious motives. Undoubtedly, these motives themselves are appreciably modified depending on particular religious doctrines. But common to them, most likely, are a desire to rely on an initial set of moral postulates which are the basis of the particular religious teaching and their attempts to "restore" their original resonance, which has been lost in subsequent ideological constructs of the church and in practice subjugated to certain functional church tasks. This situation makes it necessary to differentiate the strictly religious motivation of the antiwar protest and the church's position in the antiwar movement and identify the causes and features of the participation of believers and clerics in it. The question of the difference in their approaches to the problem of war and peace as well as their interrelations undoubtedly deserves special study. In any case, "switching on" the religious factor complicates the already complex ideological picture of the antiwar movement and its general ideological characterization even more.

Speaking of the uniqueness of the contemporary antiwar movement, such a fact as the desire inherent in it (and, by the way, in other new social movements as well) not only to propagandize but also to advertise its own ideological precepts must not be ignored. Vivid, terse, expressive posters, slogans, inscriptions on clothing, homemade posters, and symbolic buttons -- all these are not only methods of advertising borrowed from the common market of consumer goods. Something else stands behind them, specifically -- a high level of introspection, the ability to verbalize one's own internal motives, possession of the technique of formulating them internally, lack of spiritual constraint, and belief in oneself, in short, that positive new sense of self which appears in the social strata and groups named above as they grow and develop and as the society is increasingly compelled to take their position into account.

The intellectual potential and emotional heat of the antiwar movement and the activism of its participants arouses serious alarm in ruling circles. In the reactionary press an extensive "antipacifist" campaign has been waged and warnings are heard against the "destroyers of social consensus" -- the leftist intellectuals who are supposedly monopolistically controlling the mass information media and manipulating the consciousness of the population, "kindling" antiwar sentiments in the "man on the street." These accusations are proof once more that in present conditions, although they remain a means of purposeful formation of public opinion in the interests of the ruling class, the "mass media" can also play the role of a source of alternative information, including information on the realities of the nuclear century,

and thereby, as was shown earlier, help intensify and disseminate mass antiwar sentiments.

The social diversity, extreme ideological and political heterogeneity, and specific mechanism and forms of participation limited the ideological "common denominator" of this mass movement, which is the most extensive of all postwar history. It includes only a few ideological symbols: against the threat of war, against stockpiling of arms, for disarmament, (sometimes on a unilateral basis), and for negotiations. Despite all the attractiveness of these positions, they do not eliminate the fundamental contradictions of the movement in the contemporary stage: there is a desire for unity but no conception of alliances; there is a desire for peace but no alternative conception of security; there is a desire for a fair and unbiased evaluation of the political forces in the world arena (above all the United States and the USSR) but no appropriate criteria; confidence in the Western system of values is shaky and the attitude toward the experience of real socialism remains critical; and the positions of both "superpowers" are unacceptable but their own position has not been worked out. This results in the tendency to accept the conception of "equidistance," which has a destructive influence on the political orientation and practices of the movement. At the same time, however, its rapid spread indicates less -- as compared to the previous period -- susceptibility to the influence of anticommunist and anti-Soviet stereotypes when evaluating the foreign policy acts of the sides.

Within the framework of the new antiwar movement, an integral system of constructive proposals regarding possible ways to overcome conflicts identified during criticism of the governmental course has not yet been developed. As a matter of fact, the movement's program includes several fundamental and concrete demands: freezing nuclear arsenals; refusal to deploy new nuclear weapons; the creation of a nonnuclear zone in Europe; conduct of independent policy; and rejection of confrontation in favor of negotiations. Conservative ruling circles are interested in receiving the support of broad strata of the population involved in the antiwar protest in elections, but at the same time solutions which undermine the existing ratio of political forces and are in conflict with the policy of Atlanticism are unacceptable to them. Therefore, they continue to adhere to the conception of that "military equality" which frequently conceals a desire for their own strategic supremacy and of those legal guarantees which are accompanied by a number of preliminary conditions.¹⁹ Without exception all researchers -- both those who are "within" the movement and those who criticize it -- share the opinion that the movement has no conception of security which can be realistically implemented in present conditions and that therein lie the sources of its political ineffectiveness. Thus, in praising the movement as a whole as a qualitatively new level of the class struggle in the FRG, the communist author Th. Harms states that its main weakness is "insufficient clarity in understanding realistic ways of achieving universal peace."²⁰

In early 1984 the weekly DER SPIEGEL stated: "... the West has no promising plan for the development of relations with the East after the failure of detente. The reason is that in Washington, unlike in Europe, the approach to the USSR as a potential military opponent predominates."²¹ It is extremely difficult to work out a hard line for an alternative mass social movement in

relation to the fundamentally inconsistent policy of governments. In addition to the breadth and heterogeneity of the movement's social base, this circumstance is the reason, for example, that the conference of FRG peace supporters which took place in Cologne in May 1984 once again drew the depressing conclusion: "No progress has been made in working out alternative conceptions of security. As before, we still talk about such themes as 'partnership in the sphere of security' and 'in support of leaving NATO.'"²² Contradictions not only permeate the conception of security but all other ideological aspects of the new antiwar movement as well. Therefore, it is not yet possible to consider its ideology as something integral. One can rather speak of particular ideas which are characteristic of the antiwar movement and of the process of developing this ideology. However, as A. Gramshi noted, any ideology "becomes established only in the form of a more or less strange and fanciful combination of old and new views."²³

The experience of the 1970's -- the reality of a combination, at least temporarily, of the policy of detente, including negotiations on limiting nuclear-missile systems and disarmament, with acceleration of the arms race -- leaves its mark on the formation of the present precepts of the antiwar movement. Therefore, the arms race is frequently seen by the movement's participants as "autonomous" from other processes and exclusively obedient to the logic of the military-technical revolution. Correspondingly, opportunities to solve the problem of war and peace by purely political means are limited. This evaluation of the experience of past years, reflecting the real contradiction between the new character of the problem, on the one hand, and previous methods of solving it which were not always adequate to this novelty, on the other, intensifies the "crisis of confidence" in political institutions and the legitimacy of solutions made in the "corridors of power." It stimulates attempts to achieve security by acting "from below" if it is not obtained "from above." As a result, the center of gravity of the antiwar protest is shifting from the problem of the democratization of the centralized state to the problem of direct "participation" by the individual in all levels of decision-making which influence his life.

One of the forms of this participation is the declaration of certain regions and sites as nonnuclear zones. In the early 1980's, the adherents of the antiwar movement did this on a broad scale: not only cities, settlements and enterprises were declared nonnuclear, but also private residences and even particular persons. Many decisions of this type were ratified by municipal or other local organs of government. For some time the bourgeois governments did nothing against these decisions, but they were later declared "unconstitutional," contradicting state interests and outside the jurisdiction of local authorities. As a result, the demand to create nonnuclear zones, which moved from the sphere of the ideology of the antiwar movement to the field of its practical activity on the local level, is in many cases forcibly "set" back, to the arsenal of ideological slogans.

Nonetheless, it is precisely in this way -- through "local" actions -- that the participants in the peace movement with antistate sentiments conceive the possibility of opposing the formation of a new type of authoritarian state, the so-called atomic police state. Ideas about it gradually formed in the minds of the ideologists of the struggle against the use of nuclear energy,

the main targets of which initially were atomic power plants. The adherents of the conception of the "atomic police state" make paramount the specifics of nuclear technology which, in their opinion, by its very nature and its close tie -- even though potential -- with military production is incompatible with democratic forms of organization of the production process in this sphere. The spread of atomic technology makes it possible to possess nuclear weapons. But even the peaceful use of atomic energy requires strict control on the part of the state over the production, processing, transportation, and storing of radioactive substances. Where there is an atomic reactor there must also be a military guard, and a closed zone, and people who are given extreme authority which goes beyond bourgeois-democratic control. The more extensively the energy of the atom is introduced into our lives, the more guards with automatic rifles will stand at the iron gates of secret enterprises -- this is roughly the argument of the theorists to substantiate their hypothesis of a new type of state.²⁴ Not only the poisoning of the environment but the "automatic" constriction of democracy and the cultivation of local zones of totalitarianism, like a cancerous tumor capable of swallowing up the whole -- these are the consequences of using atomic energy in the conditions of capitalism. Political figures who share the ideas of the antiwar movement emphasize that the existence of nuclear weapons in the country poses an even greater threat to the direct vital interests of the citizens.

The emergence of such conceptions reflects the growth of general antistate sentiments resulting from the crisis of the bourgeois political system, which is expressed in the "crisis of confidence." It is also spreading to parties which take antimilitarist positions but whose policies many participants in the antiwar protest movement refuse to support. Some researchers are inclined to see the specific nature of the new social movements, among them the antiwar movement, precisely in their "autonomy" and independence from existing party-political institutions. They at times consider going outside the framework of these institutions, as the French researcher Ch. Buci-Glucksmann does, to be an unconditional criterion of the "real democratic process".²⁵

But, as practice confirms, by rejecting traditional forms and methods of political struggle, for example, the integration into the system of any, including leftist, party representation, the movement proves incapable of completely realizing its potential. Activism "from below" does not coincide with the objective possibility of solving problems on the political level and on the intrastate and international levels. As a result, many of the movement's ideological precepts which have not found adequate political forms of realization become utopian. Usually they rely on ideal hypothetical social and political models ("the culture of participation," "pluralistic hegemony," and the like) which exist only in the notions of the carriers of the "new consciousness," rather than relying on practical mechanisms which operate in conditions of contemporary bourgeois democracy.²⁶

The assertion of the utopian nature of many of the movement's ideological precepts should not be interpreted as a synonym for its hopelessness and groundlessness. Utopian ideals have enormous mobilizing power and this is confirmed by innumerable examples in history. The utopian principle in the new antiwar movement is rooted in its motivation, which is idealistic and radical-ethical; it is manifested in the predominance of the desire for

emotional self-expression over rational, disciplined, and organized actions; many acts which arise spontaneously are sometimes not focused on achieving any particular demands. All this makes the new antiwar movement partially elusive for a researcher trying to create a "portrait" of it or, what is even more complicated, discern its essential, permanent components. "Every day the participants in the movement themselves discover anew what the peace movement is like and what its real 'life' is like," notes the West German researcher P. Schlotter.²⁷ A. Buro, another scientist from the FRG, emphasizes that the antiwar movement must not be considered a "'machine' for 'breaking through' political decisions, and indeed the very transformations they strive for cannot be achieved by a stroke of the pen on a parliamentary decision." In his opinion, "disarmament and a policy of peace are not guaranteed either by force, or agitation and propaganda, or successfully formulated technical proposals. On the contrary, the antiwar movement should be understood as a sociocultural process of education. The attitude toward force and the causes of conflict fundamentally change during this process. . . ."²⁸

The broad popular masses' assimilation of new political, ideological, moral, and value ideas (and new forms of social activism) touches on many spheres and problems: foreign policy; state security; the role of the leading world powers and their responsibility for the arms race; national consciousness and "national identity" (related through the concept of "new nationalism," with a more just international order); the formation and functioning of ideology; criteria of trust in information; reinterpretation of the role of the individual and the collective factor in history; and certain others. The grandeur of the task of stopping the arms race predetermines the duration of this process. From this comes one other contradiction -- possibly the main one -- in the development of the new antiwar movement: between the urgency of eliminating the nuclear threat and the long-term nature of the educational work among the masses to which many antiwar organizations today are oriented.

In the process of the formation of the antiwar movement, the spontaneous antimilitarism of its participants, the spontaneity of mass actions, and the lack or underdevelopment of a platform of actions appear as a particular phase of social struggle. But the spontaneity of the movement, despite all its weaknesses, is a "sign of its intensity among the masses, the strength of its roots, and its insurmountable nature."²⁹ However, the significance of the movement's present stage is not only determined by the rapid increase in mass support of certain of its demands and initiatives but also by the expansion of its influence on the frame of mind in the society as a whole. In itself the intensity of spontaneous antiwar sentiments and demonstrations is an important factor of social life. A climate which helps develop mutual understanding and joint actions in the struggle against the threat of nuclear war and stimulates changes in positions on the problem of peace of each ideological-political force which aspires to participate in the political process and tries to influence it is created by the efforts of people of good will with different ideological convictions.

Nonetheless, for the masses with antiwar sentiments, even those capable of and ready for independent actions, to acquire the quality of historically acting masses,³⁰ their spontaneous antimilitarism must be raised under the influence of purposeful and planned work to conscious participation in the

political struggle against the strategy of the militant circles of the ruling class.

The logic of the struggle against the nuclear threat and the necessity of overcoming the contradictions and increasing the efficiency of the new antiwar movement will sooner or later force its participants into the sphere of political activity where above all the problems of the movement's interaction with other antiwar forces is paramount. Without solving these questions it is impossible to create an active social and political majority able to oppose the strategy of the "war party" and force its adherents to take the demands of those who fight against the danger of war into account and carry out particular measures to eliminate it. Consideration of the new antiwar movement from this side makes it possible to assert that, despite its specific nature, it is constituted in accordance with the general rules of the formation of mass democratic movements. Among them are the development of joint actions at a low level as the basis and decisive condition of cooperation as well as agreements on the line of the peace struggle among organization headquarters. In most cases political "summit" agreements are a result of a unity of actions "from below" and rely on this unity.

As the antiwar movement evolves, questions of shifting from simple to complex forms of coordinating actions or cooperation on national and international levels are being solved. And the principle of consensus is used more and more frequently as the most acceptable and fruitful. In addition to everything else, it allows the right of organizations or groups which are sometimes at different ideological-political poles to autonomously choose forms, means, directions, and methods of their own antiwar activity and the degree and nature of participation in the movement, as well as the right to their own initiatives. On the basis of this principle, it is possible to realize mutual interest in the voluntary cooperation of different social and political forces; this mutual interest is determined not only by the unity of goals -- the preservation of peace -- but also by tactical considerations. The latter, very naturally, have a particularly tangible effect on interrelations between the antiwar movement and those organizations for whom solving the problems of war and peace is an important or even most important but not the only direction of the work. At the same time, however, the new antiwar movement itself, which gravitates toward political institutionalization -- even formation into a party (as the recent formation of the Nuclear Disarmament Party in Australia demonstrated) -- objectively needs to incorporate the traditions and methods of mass and organizational party work and the experience of bourgeois parliamentarism. The antimissile movements which arose on the threshold of the 1980's are not yet giving a real answer to the question of how to correlate all the political experience accumulated with the new conditions of the struggle, the new quality of the ideological and cultural features of social consciousness, and the demands and interests of the classes and social groups which speak out in defense of peace. Mastering the entire arsenal of means of political struggle is one of the conditions for the formation of the organizational mechanism which insures the results of mass actions and other forms of antiwar struggle.

The antiwar movement's cooperation with working class organizations is of special significance. The prerequisites, necessity, and possibility of this

cooperation are rooted in the dialectical tie of the struggle of peace-loving forces to prevent a nuclear catastrophe with exercise of the economic and political rights of the working class which, wrote V.I. Lenin, from the standpoint of the basic ideas of Marxism, is in a position to place the "interests of general development above the interests of the proletariat -- the interests of the entire worker movement above the interests of a particular stratum of workers or particular facets of the movement."³¹

An analysis of the political requirements of the movement of peace-loving forces shows that not only does the working class need allies for the struggle against capital on all fronts, but the new antinuclear formations also feel an objective need for the historically proven experience of the working class and for its power and organization. A new system of values is maturing for both the working class and representatives of the nonproletarian strata in the cooperation of worker and social movements which oppose militarism and war. They all have something to protect together, something to fight for together, and something to fight against together. On the whole this creates a new situation both in the worker movement and in contemporary social protest movements.

We cannot help but recall that in the early 20th century, the antiwar movement united broad strata of the proletariat regardless of their party or trade union affiliation, frequently in opposition to the positions of the leaders of a number of worker parties and organizations and their conformist illusions.³² The experience of those years made it possible to conclude that the "organized, conscious movement of the working class" is a guarantee of peace³³, and to identify the growing role of the proletariat in the antiwar struggle as one of the main historical patterns of the contemporary epoch. Naturally, this pattern by no means appears automatically in each stage of the peace struggle. In particular, a debate is now going on in the international worker movement on the causes of the disparity between the enormous potential of the worker movement in the antiwar and social struggle and the clearly inadequate utilization of this potential.³⁴

Among other things, Marxists consider the insufficient activism of the working class in the sphere of the political and antiwar struggle, noted in certain capitalist countries in recent years, to be a consequence of changes which have accumulated in the working class itself (the greater complexity of its social composition, for example) as well as new conditions of the process of production and labor. These "changes have influenced the working class's way of thinking and its actions and positions"³⁵ and in the present international situation intensified the heterogeneity of levels of political consciousness within the working class of the countries of capitalism. While its progressive detachments have taken active antimilitarist positions, pessimism regarding the prospects of the peace struggle is widespread in other strata of the working class. Moreover, the social achievements of the working class, its increased political prestige, and its strengthened positions in society and the economy also have a reverse side -- the process of the worker movement's adaptation to new conditions of social protest, its modified forms, and the substantially expanded composition of its participants is slowing down.

However, the working class's participation -- in various forms -- in the peace movement helps in practice to resolve a number of important tasks: it helps increase the level of organization and consciousness of this movement and assimilate tactics and efficient methods of struggle which are new for the proletarian strata. In turn, antinuclear and other alternative groupings which sometimes pose certain problems of the struggle to defend peace more sharply than the worker movement have a generally stimulative effect on the activity of the organized working class in this field. The struggle against the threat of nuclear war and the militarization of production and society and against searching for ways to solve the crisis by escalating the arms race is becoming the core of the socioeconomic and political programs of a number of worker organizations. In this way, the worker movement receives a real opportunity to not only enrich its political practices through the experience of the new movements but also to promote the development of their objective democratic potential through its own actions.

Many representatives of the new social protest movements, including the antinuclear movement, are drawn toward socialism in search of an alternative way of life to capitalism. In essence the content of their antimilitarist struggle is also profoundly democratic. Therefore, the progressive part of the working class accepted the emergence of these movements, and above all the antinuclear organizations and groups, as a new historical factor which has an appreciable effect on the ratio of social-class and political forces in capitalist society, including direct or indirect influence on the positions of the ruling circles.

In the worker movement, especially the Western European worker movement, the thesis has recently been discussed that the contradiction between labor and capital is not manifested as the only or universal contradiction of capitalism for the working class. The idea of the strategic opposition of the state (or of state-monopoly circles) and civilian society is being discussed more and more often in trade union and party publications³⁶; in the opinion of Marxist researchers, however, this does not make the basic contradiction of capitalism less marked. In present conditions where the entire structure of social relations has become unprecedentedly complex, the multiplicity of motives and the broadening of the sociopolitical base of mass protest are becoming the basis for the conscious participation of the majority in the democratization of society. In this context the creation of an antimilitarist alliance of different forces for the purpose of solving the major question of democracy -- the question of war and peace -- proves to be one of the methods of the struggle for a democratic alternative.

Foreign labor studies literature is developing the thesis that until recently the conceptions of cooperation of the worker and nontraditional social protest movements had not been adequately worked out. This has led to certain tactical errors in this area. But it is not just a questions of conceptions. Working class organizations which are now actively focused on converging with independent antiwar formations and participate in initiatives on national and international levels together with them have in fact been included in a unique and very important experiment. In practice an effective formula for an alliance of the worker movement and new social movements in the struggle to eliminate the threat of war is being worked out in action.

A factor that frequently inhibits the development of unity of action within the movement of peace-loving forces is the mistrust of representatives of the new movements for the real positions of the working class on the struggle against militarism (they often accuse it of a pragmatic attitude toward the arms race which supposedly "feeds" the worker) as well as for the goals of its influential organizations on the problems of national security. The ideologists of these movements attribute to worker organizations the tendency to take temporizing positions regarding the development of antiwar protest and to define their role in it depending on the successes and failures of mass demonstrations. And it is frequently emphasized that the worker parties and trade unions of a number of countries joined the contemporary antiwar struggle relatively late (although one cannot fail to note that the very movement against the nuclear threat in these countries was also somewhat "late") and that the leadership of certain ruling leftist parties (the FSP [French Socialist Party] and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], for example) have generally appealed to their activists to refrain from participating in antiwar demonstrations.³⁷

In fact, the spontaneous "explosion" of activism "from below" in the struggle against nuclear war led to the development and realization by many worker organizations of contemporary antiwar policy, while the potential of mass protest proved to be greater than what traditional forms of antiwar activity could channel. Updated programs and slogans of the peace struggle and methods of action were also not accepted immediately. But there is reason to assert that already in 1984-early 1985 the working class is more and more actively engaging in supporting new manifestations of mass protest.³⁸ Its organized, more progressive part operates "in the heart" of the antiwar movement and works, in particular, in those groups of the population which merge into it and whose political consciousness is still at a relatively low level: believers, women, and youth. Special significance is given to enlisting in the struggle workers and employees involved in military production and by virtue of this most subject to illusions about the military industry's ability to alleviate crisis phenomena, insure employment, and increase the standard of living.³⁹

Marxists today examine the complex and at times contradictory processes of development of the antiwar movement from the standpoint of the need for active partnership of communist parties and trade unions with every detachment of the peace-loving forces. This realistic position finds understanding and support among the rank-and-file members of worker organizations.⁴⁰

The practice of joint actions of the working class and antiwar organizations as well as the forms of their contacts depend on such factors as the worker movement's tradition in the country, the position of its party in the political system, the degree of real influence of leftist forces, and so on. The foreign policy precepts of worker parties, among them the nature of conceptions of the country's security, are of particular significance for cooperation.

The experience of recent years demonstrates that in some countries worker parties and trade unions are becoming a component part of the antiwar

movement, operating as either an individual group or a coalition with other formations in it. In other countries, especially where trade unions and leftist parties have strong mass support, prestige, and extensive influence, the problems of interaction with formations fighting for peace are usually solved in formulas of cooperation and coordination of demonstrations. Here we see the difference between the attitudes of proletarian organizations toward the traditional antiwar movement with which particular alliances and coincidence or similarity of positions on major international questions have historically developed, a great deal of experience of uniform actions has accumulated, a type of "privileged" tie has been established, mutual support of certain initiatives has appeared, and so on. Nonetheless, the increased nuclear threat stimulates the conduct of joint demonstrations and the exchange of opinions and cooperation of leftist forces with the new movements in defense of peace, including on the international level.⁴¹

Many problems and features of the present stage of intensification of the general crisis of capitalism are strongly expressed in the antiwar movement of the 1980's. The emergence on the surface of political life of a mass protest which is antiwar in form and social in content clearly revealed the ties which exist between the militarization of the capitalist economy, social regression, and the danger of war. The arms race which the military-industrial complex is pushing lessens the constructive potential of the scientific-technical revolution, expands the gap, dangerous for human existence, between technological and social development, checks economic growth, and helps intensify antidemocratic trends in bourgeois society. In conditions of the unceasing stockpiling of means of mass destruction fraught with nuclear catastrophe, the role of the intellectual, cultural, and moral development of the working person is restricted and devalued and the process of his elevation as a conscious subject of historical action is retarded.

This fundamental contradiction between the aspirations of militarist, reactionary circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the interests of the broad working masses, the interests of saving mankind itself, forms the deep foundation, steadily expanding with each new round of the arms race, of the antiwar protest and defines the real role of the antiwar movement -- regardless of how its participants conceive of it and how its ideologists interpret it. The antiwar demonstrations of the masses -- despite the different particular slogans and demands -- from the start contain aspects of social progress. By helping to stop the trend toward the "degradation and ultimately the inevitable extinction of mankind" which is inherent in capital, they objectively have a democratic, anti-imperialist orientation and coincide with the struggle to satisfy the present and future interests of social development. Therefore, it is deeply natural that in the 1980's the "new upsurge of the worker movement and of mass social protest in the countries of capital is definitely merging with the antiwar struggle."⁴³

FOOTNOTES

1. See: B. Ponomarev, "Specific Jobs in the Name of Securing Peace" in KOMMUNIST, No 8, 1984, p 18.

2. According to some estimates, the number of participants in antiwar demonstrations in developed capitalist countries increased 10-fold in 3 years (from 1981 through 1983): from 5 million to 50 million people.
3. See: THE GALLUP REPORT, January 1982, p 5.
4. See: PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Spring 1981, pp 131-132.
5. E.C. Luck, "The Reagan Administration's Nuclear Strategy" in CURRENT HISTORY, May 1983, p 194.
6. See: THE GALLUP REPORT, June 1981, p 29.
7. See: CAMBIO-16, No 635, 1984, p 27.
8. See: PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Spring 1981, p 134.
9. But even such a weak form of antiwar protest provokes unconcealed irritation from the adherents of "Atlanticism." The evaluation which Giscard d'Estaing, the former president of France, gave is instructive: "The flourishing of neutralist ideas," in his opinion, is "the most complete expression of social decline" (L'HUMANITE, 6 March 1984).
10. See: THE GALLUP REPORT, January 1982, p 21.
11. See, for example: P. Schlotter, "Toward the Future of the Peace Movement. The Scope of Conditions of Alternative Politics" in "Die neue Friedensbewegung: Analysen aus der Friedensforschung" [The New Peace Movement: An Analysis of Peace Research], Frankfurt am Main, 1982, p 24.
12. Even the exceptionally intensive anti-Soviet propaganda campaign launched by the Reagan administration and its supporters in connection with the incident with the South Korean airliner did not have a fundamental impact on the prestige of this idea: while in the spring of 1983 81 percent of Americans supported it, in September 1983 77 percent did so (THE HARRIS SURVEY, 26 September 1983).
13. See, for example: I. Nedev, "The Contemporary Antiwar Movement: Condition, Trends, and Problems" in NOVO VREME, Sofia, No 5, 1982; Kh. Verner, "The Class Consciousness of the Workers: Evolution and Trends" in PMS, No 3, 1985; P. Schlotter, op. cit.
14. Evaluating the political consequences of this change in social consciousness, the prominent West German social democrat E. Epler writes: "The big mistake of many political scientists is that they believe that the movements which have been regenerated today -- the ecology movement, the women's movement, and the movement for peace and against nuclear weapons -- are rapidly flowering and fading fashionable phenomena. This is a fundamental misunderstanding. The point here is something altogether different, precisely -- the changes in consciousness with their different forms of manifestation. Parties which do not want to

take these changes into account will lose too much by the mid-1980's" (cited from: I. Nedev, op. cit., p 79).

15. See: "Sovremennyy kapitalizm: politicheskiye otnosheniya i instituty vlasti" [Contemporary Capitalism: Political Relations and Institutions of Power], Moscow, 1984.
16. Ch. Mouffe, "Socialism, Democracy, and New Social Movements" in "La gauche, le pouvoir, le socialisme" [The Left, Power, and Socialism], Paris, 1983, pp 150-151.
17. In our opinion, analogies, rich in content, with another form of social self-organization of the masses -- the strike -- viewed as a self-directed social activity and as a phenomenon of culture are traced in the outlined features of the new antiwar movement. (See: "Stachki: istoriya i sovremennost'" [Strikes: History and the Present], Moscow, 1978, pp 25-38).
18. In this connection, it is relevant to recall A. Gramsci's comment: "The more the individual is forced to defend his own direct physical existence, the more he relies in his convictions and actions on the increasingly more complex and extremely high values of civilization and mankind" (A. Gramsci, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Collected Works], Vol 3, Moscow, 1959, p 158).
19. See: G. Wellig, "Wege zur Kriegsverhuetung und Friedenssicherung" [Ways To Prevent War and Secure Peace], Cologne, 1983, p 11.
20. Th. Harms, "Problems of the New Peace Movement" in "Marxistische Studien" [Marxist Studies], Frankfurt am Main, 1982, Vol 5, p 210.
21. DER SPIEGEL, No 2, 1984, p 27.
22. STERN, No 22, 1984, p 234.
23. A. Gramsci, op. cit., p 28.
24. See, for example: P.K. Kelly, "Wie sich die Okologiebewegung zur Friedensbewegung erweiterte. Variante A" in "Prinzip Leben. Okorax -- die neue Kraft," Berlin, 1982, p 13.
25. See: Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, "From the Crisis of the Keynesian State to the New Socialism? Politics after the State" in "La gauche. . . , op. cit., pp 300-301.
26. See, for example: M. Mead, "Culture and Commitment: The New Relationships Between the Generations in the 1970's," New York, 1978, p 155.
27. P. Schlotter, op. cit., p 12.
28. A. Buro, "Can the 'New' Peace Movement Learn from the 'Old'?" in "Die neue Friedensbewegung. . . , op. cit., p 416.

29. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 34, p 217.
30. See: K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 2, p 90.
31. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 4, p 220.
32. See "Mezhdunarodnoye rabocheye dvizheniye. Voprosy istorii i teorii" [The International Worker Movement. Questions of History and Theory], Vol 3, Moscow, 1978, p 369.
33. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 23, p 144.
34. PMS, No 2, 1985, p 8.
35. REVOLUTION, No 160, 1983, p 11.
36. See, for example: M. Tozzi, "Syndicalisme et nouveaux mouvements sociaux: regionalisme, feminisme, ecologie" [Syndicalism and the New Social Movements: Regionalism, Feminism, and Ecology], Paris, 1983, pp 3-9.
37. In accordance with the decision of the supreme organs, some of the activists of the PSOE organization were expelled from the party for participating in the name of socialists in the antiwar demonstrations. (See: EL SOCIALISTA, No 316, 1983, pp 14-15).
38. See, for example: A.F. Khramtsov, "The FRG: The Increased Role of the Working Class in the Contemporary Antiwar Movement" in RKISM, No 6, 1984.
39. See: M. Tozzi, op. cit., p 170; MORNING STAR, 16 October 1984.
40. See, for example: L'HUMANITE, 6 December 1984.
41. For example, the French Socialist Party responded to a "memorandum by the French left" presented to the "Greens" of the FRG in the spring of 1984 which contained questions for debate on the problems of security in Europe and the "second phase" of the policy of detente. The French Socialist Party's answer noted many points of coincidence of ideas of French and West German peace advocates and also contained proposals concerning possible joint initiatives (see: REVOLUTION, No 220, 1984, pp 14-15).
42. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., Vol 23, p 279.
43. B. Ponomarev, "Real Socialism -- A Reliable Bulwark of Peace" in PMS, No 9, 1984, p 8.

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CEMA LABOR FORCE COOPERATION DETAILED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 pp 143-154

[Article by N.I. Sidorov and A. Khorvat under the rubric "Reports": "Interstate Movement of the Work Force in the Process of Cooperation Among CEMA Member-Countries"]

[Editorial Report] Opening the article with a brief resume of the main tasks of the CEMA countries in the economic sphere, as outlined at the 1984 CEMA economic conference in Moscow, the authors focus attention on the problem of labor resources, pointing out that "as socialist economic integration has developed and deepened, a significant role has begun to be played by the interstate movement of the work force of the CEMA member-countries with the aim of jointly resolving important economic tasks." They then go on to list some of the major joint projects carried out on the territory of the USSR with the participation of workers and specialists from various social countries.

"At present 18,000 Vietnamese young men and women are training and working in as many as 70 different professions in enterprises and organizations in 30 krais and oblasts, primarily in the southern regions of the Soviet Union," the authors report. The figures are similar for Mongolia -- "Since 1962 approximately 17,000 young workers have been trained in USSR vocational-technical schools for leading branches of the national economy of the Mongolian People's Republic" and "in all, approximately 25,000 Mongolian citizens have come to the USSR to study or increase their qualifications at industrial enterprises, in institutions, or on building sites in the Soviet Union."

Another socialist country with a high number of workers and students from fraternal socialist countries, the authors note, is the CSSR. By the beginning of 1984 "Almost 45,000 workers from socialist countries were employed in CSSR production organizations, including: 27,200 from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; 12,000 from the Polish People's Republic; 4,800 from Cuba; 100 from the Mongolian People's Republic; 200 from Laos; 300 from the People's Republic of Bulgaria; and 300 from the Hungarian People's Republic." Similar figures are quoted for Hungary, the GDR, and other socialist countries, and the authors point out that "thousands of specialists and highly skilled workers from other CEMA member-countries" work in the

Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Cuba, and Mongolia to help accelerate the development of the economies of these countries.

In the next section of the article, the authors deal with the subject of the 1981 intergovernmental agreement between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the terms of this agreement, and the conditions for Vietnamese students in the USSR. The aim of this agreement, the authors note, is to "train highly skilled workers for key branches of the Vietnamese national economy." According to them, "the intergovernmental agreement guarantees Vietnamese citizens rights and freedoms stipulated by the USSR Constitution," as well as defining a number of special privileges for them, such as reimbursement for the cost of travel to the USSR and back to Vietnam; free professional training, including an intensive Russian language course; a guaranteed minimum wage during the language instruction; and paid annual leave. "Vietnamese young men and women," the authors note, "actively participate in socialist competition" and they "fulfill and overfulfill set tasks, hence the constant growth in their wages, which reach and, at a number of enterprises, exceed the wages of Soviet workers in corresponding branches." However, the authors note, difficulties and shortcomings do exist, although these are being overcome.

Also of considerable interest, the authors note, is the experience accumulated in the CSSR in the sphere of vocational-technical training and temporary work for foreign citizens in CSSR organizations. However, "the particular nature and organization of this activity are frequently very diverse and are based on the interests and requirements of the individual countries and on the experience of their cooperation," although "cooperation is always mutually advantageous, except for cases of assistance rendered by the CSSR." Briefly, the authors note, "the vocational-technical training of foreign citizens can be divided into four forms." For citizens of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Mongolian People's Republic, and Laos, there is an intensive language course lasting 6 months, followed by a period of 2-3 years during which time the students acquire basic theoretical and practical knowledge. After training, the authors report, "foreign citizens work in production on the basis of labor agreements," usually for 2-3 years, before returning to their native land.

For citizens of Cuba and Laos, the training process is virtually the same, except their stay in the CSSR lasts only 4 years and the period spent acquiring production experience is outside working hours.

For Polish citizens, vocational-technical training is carried out directly in production, when they "increase their qualifications while working at an enterprise exclusively outside working hours." In this case, training lasts no longer than 3 months.

Finally, the authors say, for citizens from the Mongolian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam who already have a profession prior to coming to the CSSR, the practice is to increase their knowledge and qualifications while engaged in work in a CSSR organization.

The authors continue by enumerating the measures taken by the CSSR Government to ensure foreign citizens studying or training in the CSSR suitable living conditions, medical assistance, and so forth, noting that this is done in accordance with Czechoslovak legislation, that is, foreign citizens "have the same rights as workers, except for cases where these rights and responsibilities apply only to Czechoslovak citizenship."

Here the authors make the point that "from the very beginning of cooperation in the sphere of vocational-technical training and temporary work for foreign citizens, Czechoslovakia has proceeded from the main aim of this cooperation -- the training of worker cadres, and here there can be no question of any by-product." "The economic acceptability of vocational-technical training and temporary work for foreign citizens in Czechoslovak organizations," the authors report, "is examined by means of comparing expenditures and income." "It is assumed," they continue, "that a foreign worker will produce 90 percent of the national income produced by one qualified Czechoslovak worker during his 4-year work period," although practice has shown that in the case of SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] citizens, for example, their productivity is on the border line of economic acceptability when expenditures and income are compared. However, the authors note, this is partly due to expensive air transport costs. More important still, they emphasize, is the point that "one must not appraise economic effectiveness by the specific result of the particular cooperative act; one should above all perceive the aspects of strengthening political and economic cooperation among the countries of socialism."

After briefly mentioning the agreement between the governments of Hungary and Cuba, in accordance with which "Cuban young men and women are sent to work in enterprises in the Hungarian People's Republic for a period of 4 years," the authors note that "the diversity of forms of cooperation and assistance. . . gives rise to a pressing need for practical coordination between the countries of their principles, approaches, and conditions of acceptance for training foreign citizens."

The authors then go on to discuss the basic differences between the interstate movement of the labor force among the countries of the socialist community and international capitalist migration of the labor force. They point out that "the migration of the labor force among capitalist countries is basically an uncontrolled socioeconomic phenomenon caused by the requirements of capital, differences in the levels of economic development, the demographic situation, crises, and unemployment." On the other hand, "the interstate movement of labor resources among countries of the socialist community is a systematically regulated process reflecting the relations of international comradely cooperation and mutual assistance among fraternal peoples." And the authors note, "favorable socioeconomic prerequisites for international socialist migration of the labor force are created by economic integration." Another important difference between movement of the labor force under socialism and under capitalism, the authors note, is that under socialism the flow of labor resources is a two-way street, as the more developed countries assist developing countries in building a material-technical base for socialism.

The authors point out that "in addition to the main, economic function, interstate movement of the labor force also fulfills sociopolitical, educational functions. Explaining the main motive for this interstate movement of the labor force, the authors state that "in an economic sense it is not an export of the labor force, but a striving to make more effective use of this labor force and thereby satisfy certain important needs of the individual countries, and, simultaneously, to assist other countries in fulfilling specific economic tasks."

The authors go on to divide this interstate movement of the labor force into two categories. The first category covers "forms of cooperation aimed at jointly resolving coordinated economic tasks, in the realization of which labor resources from other countries also participate." The second category covers "forms of mutual assistance, when labor resources from less developed countries are sent to more developed ones for professional training and increasing qualifications, or when specialists and workers are sent from other countries to a less developed one to give technical assistance, for example, in the construction of units of national economic significance." The first of these groups, they say, covers the following, most widespread, forms of interstate movements of the labor force: "movement connected with cooperation between labor collectives, exchange of production experience, international socialist competition, and professional contests of skill"; "interstate movement of the labor force to build and put into operation joint (combined) enterprises"; "movement connected with utilizing construction-assembly organizations and the labor force of countries that import fuels, raw materials, and also products of the manufacturing industry"; "movement of labor resources connected with the utilization of construction-assembly organizations and the labor force in construction, assembly, commissioning, and regular production operation"; and "movement of the labor force with the aim of exploiting mineral resources and natural resources abroad for the needs of the countries sending the labor resources."

Finally, the authors draw attention to a special form of interstate movement of the labor force -- the so-called "border pendulum movement." This, they say, is one of the very earliest forms of movement and its distinguishing feature is the fact that "a decisive role is played by local organs in its organization and implementation."

Referring to the 39th CEMA session held in Havana, the authors conclude that "interstate movement of the labor force will continue to be a real phenomenon within the socialist community. This, in turn, makes it necessary, on the basis of joint research, to perfect the forms and character of this phenomenon and to perfect the labor organization of this cooperation as well."

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BOOK URGING COOPERATION OF MASS MOVEMENTS REVIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 pp 168-172

[Review by Ya.S. Drabkin and V.V. Dam'ye of book "Ne Sopernichestvo, A Sotrudnichesvo! Kommunisty i novoye v sotsial'nykh dvizheniyakh" [Cooperation Rather Than Rivalry! Communists and the New in Social Movements] under the general editorship of Yu.A. Krasin, Politizdat, Moscow, 1984, number of copies not given, 272 pages; passages in all capital letters are in italics in text]

[Text] This collective work prepared at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee is timely to the highest degree: it focuses attention on the most vitally important questions, those whose solutions to no small degree determine the world revolutionary future and the destiny and life of all mankind.

Quite a great deal has been written in certain monographs and articles about these and other new phenomena in the mass struggle which has been developing in recent years in developed capitalist countries. For the first time, however, the reader has received a book where practically the entire spectrum of diverse and varied intertwining mass movements whose general vector is focused on the future is encompassed by an analysis carried out from the viewpoint of the goals and problems of that selfless struggle for the vital interests of working people which communists are conducting in the countries of capital. The book by no means simplifies the complex and contradictory process of the formation of their mainstream and the authors do not underestimate the obstacles -- either those which have been overcome or are being overcome or those which must still be overcome -- on the path of activating and achieving the greater effectiveness of communists participating in the mass movements of our day.

The position of communists who -- not immediately but after mature reflection -- have come to the conclusion that the progressive trends which have appeared in both traditional and in really new democratic movements deserve all-out support is already sharply grasped in the slogan of the book's title. The book's classification of these movements as SOCIAL does justice not only to their scope but to the depth of the mass protest they express, which is in fact directed against state-monopoly rule or certain manifestations of it; this evaluation also contains an indication of the potential which has not yet been fully revealed in these movements.

The genetic and functional heterogeneity of the movements being examined naturally required a corresponding delineation of the subject in order to study it in depth. Following the method of moving from the abstract to the concrete, the authors begin the book with a general description of the revolutionary epoch and new developments in social movements. They analyze certain movements, moving from the latest and largest to the more traditional in the following order: contemporary antiwar movements, then ecology movements, and then citizens' initiatives, "antiauthoritarian," women's, youth, clerical, and social-democratic movements. A chapter on the policy of cooperation which briefly sums up the historical experience of the alliance of democratic forces and its development concludes the analysis.

The validity of this structure is indisputable. Following the narrative, the reader undoubtedly receives both an authentic picture of events and a scientific evaluation of them. However, the same logic of moving from the abstract to the concrete, in our opinion, permits a different, no less productive, method of revealing what is new in social movements.

In the actual course of history, as is well known, the communist movement first encountered the problem of a political alliance with social democracy, having worked out in light of this the tactics of a unified worker front; then they faced practical questions of the struggle for influence in the women's and youth movements. Then the task of a broader alliance with bourgeois-democratic (including Christian) organizations within the framework of the popular antifascist front and the Resistance Movement also became timely. In recent decades "antiauthoritarian" demonstrations opened a period of new social movements; then followed the activation of a broad circle of citizens' initiatives from which, in turn, the ecology movement grew. Finally, on the basis of the accumulated experience of all the previous and parallel-developing democratic movements, new features of the mass antiwar movement have taken shape which have given it the form in which it now exists, acquiring unprecedented scope. Briefly, the very material of the book under review cannot fail to suggest -- to the historian, in particular -- that in this particular case the unity of the historical and the logical is in the final analysis appearing. Considerations on precisely this level compel us to examine certain movements in reverse order from that used in the book. It seems to us that this not quite common method helps the reader look at the problems posed in the book and at their sources and historical sense, and from a different angle of approach see the successive ties of the various movements better and be convinced once again of the value of the fresh materials gathered in the monograph and the validity of the generalizations made.

Let us begin with the "old" problem of the UNITY OF ACTIONS OF COMMUNISTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS. In recent years it has shown different aspects. The well-known "reevaluation of values" done by the Socialist International and certain parties which joined it and a certain activation of the left wing of social democracy are related, in particular, to a realistic evaluation by some social-democratic figures of the experience of detente and the greater attention to disarmament and preserving peace. The facts cited in the book on the ideological-theoretical evolution of the Socialist International parties attest to the increased opportunity for communists to cooperate with them,

primarily on the level of low-level proletarian organizations. It is a pity only that the sphere of trade union activity and the struggle for worker control, "co-participation" in government, and the like are outside the author's field of view in the corresponding chapter.

In the chapter on NEW PHENOMENA IN COMMUNISTS' RELATIONS WITH BELIEVERS, analysis of the facts confirms the growing polarization in churches, the radicalization of the masses of believers and the clerical revision of certain old conceptions, the readiness of certain groups of them for a dialogue with Marxists, the entry of many religious organizations into the antiwar movement, and the dissemination of the so-called "theology of liberation." Contacts have increased owing to the general struggle for democracy and experience in joint actions has been accumulated. It seems to us that work among the masses conducted by such organizations as the Christian Association of Italian Working People (AKLI), which has the opportunity to influence youth, parents, and children, deserves attention and analysis.

One can agree with the idea of the author of the chapter on THE YOUTH MOVEMENT, which, as is well known, experienced a period of rapid upsurge in the late 1960's, that, although those earlier forms of protest are not encountered in it now, one can nonetheless see the movement's general shift to the left through its multifaceted nature, changeableness, and ambiguity. In various ways, urged on by unemployment and the lack of prospects for improving the state of affairs, significant strata of youth overcome disappointment in collective forms of struggle and protest and enlist in all the mass movements, becoming their backbone and forming their most restless part. Further study of such new forms of organization as "youth centers" seems important to us.

THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT for equality, which has a long-standing tradition, managed to achieve the recognition and partial realization of its demands only after joining the general emancipation struggle of working people. As the book notes, in our day "the activization of numerous social movements has had an effect on the frames of mind of women" (p 148); in turn, women's participation in them has increased their scope and power. Neofeminist movements sometimes pose the problems of the place and role of women in social life in a new way.

Among the really new -- both in content and in form -- social movements, those included under the rubric ANTIAUTHORITARIAN MOVEMENTS were the first to show activism. Back in the 1950's separate groups appeared under the slogan "for a new way of life." The author of the chapter on "antiauthoritarians" distinguishes two basic directions -- the "beatniks" and the "situationalists," noting that the ideological "baggage" of these and others made up the mixture of anarchist, socialist, and partly bourgeois-liberal ideas. To a certain degree the make-up of the "new left" and "counterculture" movements were formed from these ideas in the 1960's. We will note in passing that while the former has been given a substantial place in historical and political science works, interest in the latter has been confined almost exclusively to students of literature. The aggregate analysis of these trends contained in the book makes it possible to more clearly view the essence of social protest included in them behind the fanciful forms.

Extremely diverse organizations and groups developed in the heart of these movements ("hippies," "provos," "kabuters," "autonomists," "base groups," "spontis," and so on). Later, many of them merged into the "alternative movement" in which two contradictory trends are traced: individualistic revolt against the norms and restrictions of the existing society and a democratic urge to fight against capitalism (pp 106-107). Advocates of creating an "alternative economy" with "soft technology" and all kinds of autonomous groups, "ecology communes," and "ecosystems" have appeared in the ecology movement. In the neofeminist movement the struggle against the "patriarchate" is declared a struggle "against any HIERARCHY, any LEADERSHIP, ANY government, and against the very idea of authority" (p 119).

Data on the social composition of the "alternative" movement confirms that representatives of the humanitarian intelligentsia and young people, primarily from the "new" and partly from the "old" middle strata, predominate in it. The author believes that individualism, subjectivism, higher social expectations which generate instability, and frequently, extremism are inherent in this medium: "Depending on the situation, they are prepared to follow both anarchists and fascists and at times can support organized progressive movements as well" (p 122). The changed position of these strata in conditions of the present crisis, characterized by reduced confidence in state authority and the weakness of liberalism, pushes them closer to the revolutionary vanguard of the working class. In the very nature of "antiauthoritarian protest" and in the psychology of its participants, as the book notes, are features which enable them to evolve in this direction: criticism of the antidemocratic and antihumanist nature of capitalism and appeals for activism, resistance, and social creativity (pp 132-133).

However, many obstacles rise up on the paths of communists' cooperation with "antiauthoritarian" movements. Anticommunist prejudices are strong in these movements. Participants in them often generally reject organized forms and agree only to "joint demonstrations to solve particular questions" (p 139). Groups of the asocial, escapist persuasion avoid the struggle while many "autonomists" are inclined to adventurist actions and capable of compromising the revolutionary struggle. In further studying the "antiauthoritarian" movements, it is important to turn attention to the changes related to developing so-called alternative social values with which the participants in the movements hope to "replace" the bourgeois way of life. Among them, in addition to ideas of self-assertion and self-realization of the individual and decentralization of social management, appears the desire to work and live together, although in small associations, a type of "new collectivism," that is, some increase in collectivist precepts at the expense of bourgeois-individualist egoism is taking place.

In the chapter on CITIZENS' INITIATIVES, the attempt to summarize everything that is known on the activities of all kinds of block committees, mutual assistance alliances, and other local groups in various countries is of interest. This new phenomenon reflected the desire of simple people to break loose from the fetters of alienation and free themselves from the ever-present tentacles of monopolies and the onerous guardianship of state institutions in order, to even some extent, "to take their destiny into their own hands." Such aspirations had appeared even earlier but in the second half of the

1970's independent movements reached a new qualitative and quantitative level and while at first one-time and emphatically nonpolitical initiatives predominated, later they began to gradually enter the general course of the political and social struggle, turning into an important factor of contemporary political culture. And the author of the chapter considers spontaneity, independence, lack of party affiliation and hostility to traditional forms of politics, and advocacy of nonviolent actions their organizational-political principles. Let us note that the latter frequently does not exclude going beyond the boundaries of bourgeois legality (in particular, occupations, the seizing of objectives, blockades, and the like).

The book singles out three directions of citizens' initiatives according to functional character: 1) groups and committees which have as their goal protecting the interests of apartment tenants, children, and so on, protecting ecological objectives and monuments of culture as well as opposing military construction, and so forth; 2) self-realization groups, participating in collective forms of leisure; and 3) groups which carry out certain tasks in the field of low-level self-government. These directions of activity are usually intertwined; moreover, under the influence of changes in the economic and political situation and the accumulation of their own experience, functions related to establishing a "new way of life," solving ecological problems, and antiwar demonstrations are expanded.

While bourgeois and social-reformist parties are trying to belittle the importance of citizens' initiatives, communists see these initiatives as a manifestation of qualitatively new, profound processes caused by objective changes in social life. The attack of monopolies and the state on elementary human rights, the separation of the masses from the decision-making process, and the inability of reformers of capitalism to guarantee a satisfactory "quality of life" have all given rise to disappointment with the traditional parties who take turns in power (especially social-democratic parties), bourgeois norms of behavior, and customary values. Initiatives "from below," initially modest, have begun to grow, becoming a "counterpoise to the imperialist state machine." There is reason to assume that if they develop into a struggle to protect and expand democracy, citizens' initiative movements can create of type of "nucleus of counterauthority" (p 92). This question requires further study since these organs could play an important role in critical situations, especially if the further politization of the initiatives occurs and if the movement, where representatives of the middle strata now predominate, comes closer to the revolutionary worker movement. In light of this, as the book justifiably notes, communists themselves are learning to see the increasing significance of the entire structure of the "nonproduction," individual, and local life of man and the humanist problem of self-realization of the individual and are becoming increasingly certain that the participants in the initiatives should not be seen only as temporary "fellow-travelers."

Let us note that as a rule the politization of citizens' initiatives has not occurred directly, but rather through the dissemination of "alternative" ideas and the need for a "new way of life," usually with an ecological slant, among the participants in these initiatives. It is no accident that the

coordinating center set up in the FRG in 1972 took the name "Alliance of Citizens' Initiatives to Protect the Environment."

The chapter on ECOLOGY MOVEMENTS demonstrates their social and political ambiguity using examples of the "Green" Party in the FRG and movements in certain other countries. However, an analysis of program documents alone does not reveal the existence of competing ideological-political directions in the movement's composition: adherents of the reform of capitalism, on the one hand, and champions of another, in point of fact, noncapitalist way of life -- on the other. Left-radical elements are increasing among the latter. At the same time, however, attempts to shift the ecology movement to the right, even to a course of neo-Naziism, have not ceased.

The book justifiably emphasizes the objectively anticapitalist ring of ecological problems themselves, generated by the crisis condition of the environment in developed capitalist countries. The policies of monopolies turn the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution to the detriment of the living environment and lead to the further deepening of the ecological crisis. Therefore, "the logic of the very life of capitalist society leads ecology movements to sociopolitical problems and compels them to define their political position and, consequently, draw conclusions" (p 67). Thus, the "Greens" movement in the FRG, which began in the bosom of citizens' initiatives as disconnected groups and directions and which initially had a negative attitude toward the entire political "establishment," including participation in elections, later came to promoting "Green," "alternative," and "mixed" election slates in elections to local government organs and Landtags, and in 1980 merged into a political party; fundamental successes in state and federal and recently so-called "European" elections turned it into a significant force in the FRG political arena. There is no doubt that not only directly ecological demands but also ecologically slanted protest against the nuclear arms race and the "Greens'" active participation in the antiwar, antimissile movement played a certain role in this. As the book demonstrates, from the time of the 1980 debate on the pages of the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, communist parties have made headway in revealing the fundamental role of ecology movements in the contemporary class struggle. Communists believe that the identification of the social roots of the ecological crisis and realistic ways to overcome it should be the center of the struggle in ecology.

New development in THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT and the "major, and one may say, qualitative changes" (p 23) which have occurred in it are related in the monograph to the challenge thrown down to the world by the U.S. administration and the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The scope of the movement and the entry into it of formerly passive social strata, local and narrow-purpose groups, an increasing number of political parties and social trends, and religious organizations does not, of course, signify the emergence of a fundamentally new movement, since there are no major disagreements between its "old" and "new" participants which could not be directly overcome during the joint struggle. And their common goals of preventing a world-wide catastrophe unite them.

The historical credit for the initiative to expand the struggle for peace belongs to communists and from time immemorial they have been the most consistent champions of peace. Today they support the idea of "creating an all-encompassing antiwar coalition which would include the actions of the broadest strata of the population and the broadest possible spectrum of political forces" (p 36). Among them, of course, are the pacifists. The establishment and clarification of what they have in common and what is different in the approaches of communists and pacifists is very useful in clearing the ground for cooperation, which is now more favorable than ever.

The first chapter of the book gives an important general description of contemporary social movements. It says here, "Despite the limited nature of the tasks and goals proposed and the individualistic motives of many of their participants, they break down the stereotypes of social conduct and strike a blow against the established customary way of life... And although most of their participants are subjectively still far from socialist ideals, objectively the movements demand different social relations" (pp 4-5). Revealing the roots of the activation of social movements, the author of the chapter points out above all the influence of real socialism, on the one hand, and imperialism's increased threat to the very existence of mankind, on the other. Although by no means all the participants see the real sources of the catastrophe which threatens the world clearly, and although ideas of the "equal responsibility of the two superpowers" are widespread among them and some are also inclined to take on faith the myth of the "Soviet threat" imposed by imperialist propaganda, the movements being examined nonetheless have an anti-imperialist orientation. "People with different political convictions and professed religions. . . consciously or spontaneously try by the means available to them to somehow influence the development of political events which may lead to nuclear war" (p 7).

Frequently participants in the struggle are not aware that their general and specific demands can only be realized to a small extent or not realized at all under the existing social order. Sooner or later this becomes clear to them and then it comes to light that "potentially, the social movements of contemporary times have a great socialist core within them. They act partly as real and partly as possible allies of the international working class which is leading the revolutionary struggle for socialism" (p 14). An optimistic evaluation, however, must not shield the fact that only the future will show to what extent these movements are included in revolutionary prospects. Today their ideological make-up is characterized by a fanciful intertwining of the most diverse views -- from anarchistic views to certain elements borrowed from Marxism. Frequently their participants proclaim hostility to Marxism and real socialism and from the outset reject any contacts with the communist parties of their own countries. Nor must one believe that communists themselves have completely rid themselves of sectarianism, that they have learned, as V.I. Lenin demanded, "not to fear difficulties and not to fear fault-finding, trip-ups, insults, and persecution... and absolutely TO WORK WHERE THE MASSES ARE."¹ And the truth repeated once again in the book that ideological debates with allies must be carried out voluntarily, in forms and by methods different from those of the struggle against the ideologists of imperialism, without claiming to have a monopoly on developing the appropriate program of actions (p 230), is completely relevant. This is especially true since certain new

problems whose solutions enriched Marxist thought were "initially, though incompletely, on a one-sided and even distorted basis, formulated within the framework of non-Marxist theoretical conceptions which arose in the core of the new social movements" (p 21). All this should be taken into account and reflected by the "honest dialogue in which social practices are the main arbitrator" (p 19).

As is apparent from what has been said, the book under review is valuable not only because it encompasses a broad circle of the latest phenomena but because it also gives food for thought and poses new research tasks. Thus, the continued study of mass movements obviously requires a more developed analysis of hostile, opposing forces and trends, among them the processes of modernizing the methods of manipulating social consciousness and activating right and ultraleft extremists trying to destabilize the situation and split and weaken social movements. The internal struggle of various ideological-political trends in the mass movements themselves also deserves fixed attention. But these are already topics of other books. In the work being reviewed the author collective has successfully performed the tasks posed for it.

FOOTNOTE

1. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 41, p 36.

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GERMAN BOOK ON 'CRISIS GENERATION' IN FRG REVIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 pp 179-181

[Review by A.F. Khramtsov of book "Die Verunsicherte Generation. Jugend und Wertewandel" [The Insecure Generation. Youth and Changes in Value Orientations], a report of the Institute for the Study of Public Opinion (Synus), prepared on the instructions of the Federal Ministry of Youth, Family, and Health, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1983, number of copies not given, 168 pages]

[Text] The first half of the 1980's is a special period in the social history of the FRG: a generation which has spent practically all its conscious life in circumstances radically different from those of "economic miracle" days is entering independent life for the first time. Uninterrupted inflation, mass unemployment which strikes young people particularly hard, the general deterioration of their socioeconomic position and, moreover, the ruling coalitions' lack of desire or inability to help the matter -- this is the situation, very close to continual crisis, and the new generation has never known any other. Added to all this at the start of the present decade was the sharply increased danger of war as a result of imperialism's increased aggressiveness and NATO's increased military preparations. But the coming to power of the right-centrist CDU/CSU-FDP [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union -- Free Democratic Party] government coalition provided the monopolies with additional opportunities to launch an all-out offensive on the vital interests of young people.

The indisputability and increasing urgency of the conclusion drawn by West German communists is confirmed: in present conditions in the FRG one of the most critical sociopolitical conflicts is determined by the contradiction "between the younger generation's right to a secure future and the refusal of monopoly capital and the parties which are part of the bourgeois social system to grant this generation this basic right," a circumstance which leaves a deep imprint on the way of thinking and acting of FRG youth and on their sociopsychological development. In the past 10 years the contradictory nature of this development has substantially increased.

But what is the new young generation like? What does it strive toward and what values does it recognize? How does it differ from preceding generations? These are questions which literally all political forces in the country are

posing, understanding that the future belongs to those whom the new generation follows.

As for traditional Bonn political parties, their interest in the problems of youth has increased sharply precisely in recent years. While the theme of "youth and the youth movement" has always received the broadest coverage in the progressive press, it had almost completely disappeared from the pages of bourgeois and social-democratic publications in the period 1973-1978. But today the number of publications on this theme as well as the number of comprehensive surveys of young people is actively growing. How is this to be explained?

In our opinion, three main causes can be discerned. In the first place, the rapid positive development of the youth movement itself as well as the broad participation of youth in various nonparliamentary movements, above all -- in the antiwar movement (and it has become the largest general democratic movement in the country's entire history): young people make up from 66 to 99 percent of the participants of its most mass demonstrations -- observers of the most diverse political directions agree on this evaluation. Secondly, the behavior of voters between 18 and 30 years of age seriously alarms the leaders of the traditional Bonn parliamentary parties: in the early 1980's an increasing number of them turned from these parties, giving their votes to figures of the ecology-alternative movement and its political representation -- the "Green" Party, which in 1983 went over the 5-percent barrier and put representatives into the Bundestag. Thirdly, the demands of the ideological struggle on these questions, which became more acute as 1985, declared the Year of Youth by the United Nations, approached, to a certain degree may also account for the increased attention on the problems of the country's young generation.

The order given by the Federal Ministry of Youth, Family, and Health to the Institute for the Study of Public Opinion (Synus) in the fall of 1981 was a reflection of the increasing interest of Bonn politicians in these problems: the subject was to identify the "changes in the structure of motivations" in the behavior of FRG youth. The basis of the research work which resulted in the book being reviewed, which came out in 1983, was a survey of 2,012 young people of 15 to 30 years of age conducted in July-August 1982.

Casting a general glance at the existing evaluations of the way of thinking and acting of FRG youth by bourgeois and social-democratic experts on youth, the authors note their extreme contradictoriness. The titles of various publications which have appeared in just 6 months are very instructive in this regard. For example, "Pessimistic Youth in Search of Values"; "Most Young People Look Optimistically into the Future"; "The Youth of 1981: No Trust in the Future"; "Most Young People See the Present and the Future in a Somber Light"; "Absolutely No One Is Getting Off Our Train"; "Surveys Show: Most Youth Are Completely Normal"; "The Increasing Departure of Young People into Internal Emigration"; "The Youth Revolution of 1981: A Desire for More Deception"; and so on (p 28). The authors see the root of this contradictoriness in the equally contradictory nature of the young generation's changes in basic value orientations themselves (see p 29), while the point of view which explains the diversity and contradictory nature of the

results obtained from research on youth as the difference in the researchers' fundamental ideological positions, which the work under review criticizes, is, in our opinion, groundless.

Of course, the sociopsychological development of youth is in fact characterized by trends which contradict each other to a significant extent. One of these trends is young people's desire to overcome present difficulties individually, relying on their own strengths and rejecting collective forms of the struggle for one's rights. The development of this trend is zealously stimulated by rightist forces which create an atmosphere in the country where noncritical adaptation to existing political and economic relations is considered a civic virtue. This "antisolidarity" mood of FRG youth, by the way, is one of the sources of the origin of ideas of "new conservatism" in the worker movement.

Another trend is manifested in the growth of individual asocial activism of youth which is reflected in the spread of alcoholism, drug addiction, suicide, crime, and degradation of the personality. Its development allows the bourgeois press to talk of today's youth as the "lost generation" or the "generation without a future" -- with the self-serving goal of increasing the fatalistic mood and inducing youth to believe that the struggle for their rights has no future.

The third trend is expressed in collective asocial activism: in participation in right- and left-extremist organizations, in terrorism, and, to a certain degree, in the increased influence of nontraditional religions on FRG youth. However, it is precisely this direction of youth activism which is traditionally more extensively covered in the bourgeois press. Since the second half of the 1960's, when the youth movement became a mass movement, bourgeois mass information media have intentionally begun to attach special significance to the activities of eccentric and extremist circles of this movement, attempting to pass it off as the basic content of the youth struggle. Bourgeois ideologists thereby try to arouse a "they're spoiled" response in the burger in the first case, and fear and hatred in the second. Thus, the youth movement of the late 1960's-early 1970's was described as the product of the activities of hippies and the most extremist "New Left," the middle-1970's -- of terrorists, and the late 1970's-early 1980's -- of "squatters" and the most eccentric participants in the "alternative movement."

In recent years the fourth trend has particularly developed -- the trend toward the creation of certain "youth islands" within the framework of capitalist society, with the lifestyle characteristic only of them. This trend is above all manifested in the FRG in the growth of the alternative-ecology movement and the organizations set up by it, a significant number of whose members are young people. Nonetheless, the development of this movement shows that it is acquiring a more and more markedly anti-imperialist and antimilitarist character, becoming an important factor of the general democratic movements in the country.

And finally, the fifth trend in the development of the mass consciousness and behavior of FRG youth is the trend toward recognition of the need for collective actions and an organized struggle to protect their own rights and

interests. Increasingly greater numbers of FRG youth are entering the path of active struggle for peace, socioeconomic rights, democracy, and social progress. The most important manifestation of this trend is, as was already pointed out, the development in the country in recent years of the antiwar movement, the main mass of whose participants are young people. The number of demonstrations against unemployment, for democratic reforms of vocational-technical and higher educational systems, and against cutting expenditures for social needs is increasing. The influence of progressive youth organizations is growing and the inclination toward unity of actions is being manifested more clearly. Bourgeois ideologists have always preferred to view the development of this trend as if through inverted binoculars, although it is precisely this trend which has been and is the pivotal direction of the youth movement in the FRG.

It is clear from what was said above that, despite the opinion of the authors, the diversity of the trends of the sociopsychological development of the young generation is by no means the cause of the contradictory nature of its evaluations and the desire of various authors to overemphasize and absolutize only a certain part of the changes in youth's way of thinking and acting -- behind this most often are fully defined class interests.

The main instrument of falsification of the contemporary history of the youth movement in the FRG by bourgeois and right social-democratic politicians, scientists, and publicists is above all the deliberate distortion of the proportions of the development of various trends of change in the consciousness and mode of action of young people. This instrument is convenient because it allows schemes proposed by various authors to appear convincing since in details these schemes can adequately reflect reality. But the general picture of the position, consciousness, and behavior of youth created in this way will recall a portrait, all whose details in themselves accurately reflect the features of the model but each of which is drawn to its own scale. As compared with this "portrait," even a primitive child's drawing would appear much more accurate.

But what general picture of the sociopsychological development of the young generation of the FRG in the contemporary stage do the authors themselves present? It is clear from their study that the feeling of solidarity among youth is highly developed, while "antisocial" trends have not taken very deep root. The work being reviewed thereby shows the groundlessness of the viewpoint of those who reduce the entire complex, ambiguous process of development of contemporary youth consciousness in the main to the first of the trends enumerated above and on this basis (as, for example, the well-known writer Henrich Boll) see today's youth as a generation of scoundrels, time-servers, toadies, and cowards.

From the results of the surveys it is clear, for example, that about 90 percent of the young people attach particular importance to the development of a system of collective social security, rather than to individual efforts to insure their own personal future by rejecting the struggle. And the response of youth to the problems of other generations also appears very clearly: 83 percent of those surveyed consider the material security of the elderly an "important" or "very important" problem (see p 16). The attitude

of youth themselves toward the second of the trends mentioned above is notable: the overwhelming majority of young people believe, for example, that they do not face the problem of drug addiction personally, but three-quarters find that the problem of drug addiction among their peers is exceptionally urgent (see p 17).

As for the attitude of those surveyed to the collective asocial activism of some young people and to the most extremist and eccentric circles of the youth movement, the latter, as the data cited shows, do not enjoy any appreciable support among youth, and their few followers will in due time decline -- a conclusion which the authors draw on the basis of comparing their own results with the results of a survey conducted a year earlier. The book notes the decline in popularity of the "squatters" (see p 61), which the authors explain as a certain sobering up and loss of illusions in regard to the effectiveness of such a form of struggle as seizing empty houses, as well as the fact that the news media in the country have begun to devote much less attention to this. This explanation contains an indirect acknowledgement of the fact that frequently it is precisely the FRG mass information media which to a significant extent "induce" the asocial way of thinking and acting of youth.

On the whole the materials of the work being reviewed clearly show the speculative nature of the interpretation of the youth movement in the country as primarily a result of the activities of extremist and eccentric groups in the movement itself. However, the conclusion that the continuing crisis development of the economy as well as the aggravation of sociopolitical conflicts in the FRG leave open the question of what side the attitude of youth toward extremism and force can evolve toward also deserves attention.

The work being reviewed is convincing concerning the increased hostility of the country's young generation toward the political system which exists there. Of those surveyed 51 percent are dissatisfied with it. Young people have very different points of view on the question of how they can exert influence on the system to change it for the better. Of those surveyed 81 percent believe participating in elections is an effective form of this influence; 69 percent believe cooperation in citizens' initiatives and self-help groups is; 67 percent -- work in trade unions and production councils; 57 percent -- activity in the ranks of some party; 56 percent -- gathering signatures on appeals; 45 percent -- participation in sanctioned demonstrations; and 14 percent -- participation in spontaneous demonstrations (p 55). It is noteworthy that although the survey did not deal with anyone who considered himself a communist, 42 percent consider the existence of the anticommunist "ban on occupations" to be a major problem (p 54). Among those surveyed there was also no one who would declare himself an opponent of the antiwar and ecology movements -- these movements are, according to the conclusions of the report, the most attractive to youth from the standpoint of their demonstrating their political activism (p 57).

However, the authors of the study focus attention above all on one particular problem -- the attitude of youth toward the "alternative" movement, which apparently reflects the increased interest of the client on precisely this problem. From the authors' point of view, the basic trend of the sociopsychological development of contemporary FRG youth (that is the central

idea of the entire book) is determined by the opposition of "materialism" (by which is meant "traditional" socioeconomic needs and demands) and "postmaterialism," "old" and "new" values. The authors classify the values of the alternative movement -- such as "way of living and consumption which takes into account the need to save the environment," "a critical attitude toward the terror of consumptionism," "the desire for a simple, natural life," and partly -- "life in a commune," and so on -- as "postmaterial" and "new" values. It is impossible to agree with the authors that a decisive factor in the changes in the consciousness and behavior of youth is precisely the two trends mentioned, two supposedly opposing sets of values and, moreover, incorrectly set against each other as if they were mutually exclusive and as if the first had for the most part "become obsolete." The authors themselves cite numerous data which contradicts the scheme they have concocted. Thus, only 6 percent of those surveyed consider themselves part of the "alternative movement" and only 10 percent assert that they practice alternative forms of life, but at the same time 56 percent try to "oppose the terror of consumptionism and live simply" (p 17).

Without agreeing with the book's basic idea, it may nonetheless be noted that the wealth of empirical material, the validity of many particular conclusions, and the very desire of the authors to establish how the objective situation in the country influences the consciousness of youth makes the work under review extremely interesting to a researcher.

FOOTNOTE

1. "VI s'yezd Germanskoy kommunisticheskoy partii. Gannover, 29-31 maya 1981 g.", [6th Congress of the German Communist Party. Hannover, 29-31 May 1981], Moscow, 1982, pp 51-52.

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BOOK CRITICIZING BOURGEOIS, REFORMIST THEORIES REVIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 pp 184-185

[Review by N.M. Azarkin of book "Problemy gosudarstva i prava v sovremennoy ideologicheskoy bor'be" [Problems of the State and Law in the Contemporary Ideological Struggle] edited by Academician Ya. Radev and Professor V. Tumanov, Nauka i izkustvo, Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1983, number of copies not given, 208 pages]

[Text] This joint monograph of Soviet and Bulgarian scientists contains a detailed criticism of contemporary bourgeois and reformist theories on questions of the state and law. As Academician Ya. Radev (People's Republic of Bulgaria) shows in the introduction, in the ideological struggle against the world of socialism the defenders of bourgeois democracy, diligently avoiding questions of socioeconomic rights and insuring them, nonetheless consider the principle of equality paramount. But even so, needless to say, they never conceive of it as universal and equal ownership of the means of production. They "focus attention on political rights, where it seems to the bourgeoisie that it is easier for it to pose as a 'defender of freedom'" (p 5). But the bourgeoisie without hesitation rejects even formal equality before the law (which "finds its refutation in the unequal rights fixed in bourgeois laws themselves") along with other "sacred" principles any time its class supremacy seems threatened (p 6).

There are seven chapter-articles in the book which reveal the uniform, general essence of various directions of bourgeois research on the state and law -- protecting the class interests of the bourgeoisie. V.A. Tumanov's article "On Certain Features of the Latest Bourgeois Political and Legal Ideology" studies, in particular, the reflection of the economic crisis of the early 1970's in ideological-political life when the failure of the postwar model of the "welfare state" was accompanied by a rise in the strength of the right-conservative ideologists, who tried to substantiate the antiworker policy of "belt-tightening." In the article "Problems of Legal Equality in Contemporary Bourgeois Ideology," G.V. Mal'tsev reveals the essence of the very phenomenon of the contradictions and disagreements between liberals and conservatives. Liberal, or egalitarian, conceptions, he notes, on the whole are not only utopian but harmful in the sense that even in theory they shift the center of the struggle against social inequality from the sphere of base relations to the superstructure, to the political-ideological field. As for

conservative ideologists with their assertions that the "unrealistic," "unviable" idea of equality has no roots in past or present bourgeois society, their attacks on liberal ideology are carried out with a long-range aim: ultimately, they are also directed against socialist ideas. The dispute between conservatives and liberals, G.V. Mal'tsev sums up, is essentially about how to further develop capitalism so that it can hold out and survive in the epoch which, in accordance with scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis, is the epoch of the collapse of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. M.N. Marchenko's article "A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of the Political System of Contemporary Socialism" reveals the "class-apologetic, methodological, 'applied,' and anticommunist roles" which different variants of the bourgeois conception of capitalism's political system which were actively developed back in the 1950's perform.

One of the central features of the ideological content of the entire book is the concrete exposure of the thesis on socialist law as the highest type of law. In light of this, polemics with those who falsify Marxism are conducted on all sections of the science of the state and law.

In the article "The Development of Marxist Doctrine on the State and the Ideological Struggle," L.S. Mamut considers questions of the general theory of the state, the problems of the socialist state system, and various aspects of methodology as objects of the ideological struggle. The article emphasizes the complex, global nature of the process of the development of the Marxist-Leninist science of the state. "The communist movement," writes the author, "has accumulated an enormous amount of experience. It includes experience in building socialism in very diverse conditions, which demonstrates both general rules and diverse particular forms, and the experience of protecting the vital interests of the masses, assembling revolutionary forces, and the struggle for socialism in countries with different levels of development. . .The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state accumulates all the achievements of political practices and knowledge produced in the contemporary epoch" (pp 60-61).

A unique "division of labor" has taken shape in the ideological struggle of the opponents of Marxism against the theory and practices of the socialist states: while bourgeois ideologists focus efforts on proving the fundamentally "nondemocratic" nature of the socialist state, social reformists and revisionists talk repeatedly of the "disparity" between the Marxist theory of the state and the practice of real socialism; in both cases the goal is the same -- to shake people's faith in the possibility of a socialist reorganization of society. Does the victory of the socialist revolution demand that a new type of state be built? In the article "The Question of Scrapping the Bourgeois State Machine and the Ideological Struggle," V. Zakharov (People's Republic of Bulgaria) identifies the general essence of the various revisionist conceptions on this question; this essence is the rejection of the Marxist-Leninist strategy of destroying the bourgeois state and the replacement of this strategy with "democratic reorganization" and "gradual seizure of the bourgeois state from within." The article demonstrates the complete applicability of the indepth and weighted Leninist analysis of the problem -- with its principled conclusion on the impossibility of such a "seizure" and, in addition, on the utilization of elements of the

old state apparat in the interests of socialist revolution -- to contemporary conditions.

N. Ananiyeva's (People's Republic of Bulgaria) article "Social-Reformist Theories of the State and Law" is specially devoted to a critical analysis of social-reformist views. Despite the fact that problems of the state and law occupy one of the central places in social-reformist ideology, social democracy of our day does not have an integral theory of the state and law within the framework of its basic conception -- "democratic socialism." The inconsistency of the approach of its theoreticians to political-legal phenomena, notes N. Ananiyeva, is related to its dual essence as an element of the bourgeois political system and simultaneously a mass movement which relies on the broad strata of working people. The following fact is related precisely to this circumstance: on the one hand, social-democratic conceptions generally deal with the state and democracy and law and legislation in general rather than particular socioeconomic types of states and law (which Marxist theory interprets); while, on the other, a theoretical (and practical) interest in Marxism is always preserved within the social-democratic movement.

An important aspect of the ideological struggle is presented in V.S. Nersesyants's article "Problems of the History of Political-Legal Doctrines in the Contemporary Struggle of Ideas." The political and legal doctrines of the previous epochs take part in the present ideological struggle on a mediated basis, supplying material for praising and supporting, or for refuting and discrediting certain contemporary views in light of the "authority" of history. Systematizing contemporary bourgeois interpretations of views of the past and viewing general methodological and worldview precepts by which bourgeois ideologists are guided in evaluating various political-legal doctrines of the past and of the present, the author emphasizes that common to these precepts is a rejection of the principle of historicism, which prevents the understanding and accurate evaluation of the particular-historical sense and nature of various political-legal theories.

In addition to methodological clarity, profound ideological content, and rich historiography, the clarity of the presentation of extremely complex theoretical material distinguishes the book. This makes it possible to recommend it not only to students of the law, but also to the broader circle of readers who are interested in the problems of the contemporary ideological struggle.

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